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Discretion of Corporate Management To Do Good at the
Expense of Shareholder Gain-A Survey of, and
Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law
Kenneth B. Davis, Jr.*

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

Although it was rendered relatively early in our experience with the
public corporation, the widely cited decision by the Supreme Court of
Michigan in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. I has continued for several decades
to reflect the mainstream stance of formal American legal doctrine on the
freedom of corporate managers2 to sacrifice shareholder gain in order to
further various social welfare objectives. In informing Henry Ford that
he did not enjoy unfettered discretion to withhold dividends and forego
profits in the interests of reducing the price of the automobile to the
consumer, the court stated:
There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties
which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the
general public and the duties which in law he and his co-directors owe
to protesting, minority stockholders. A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that
end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction
of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in
order to devote them to other purposes.3
The significance of this quotation lies in the way it succinctly captures both the letter and the reality of management's obligations under
the traditional American position. At one level are the formal constraints imposed by the core principle the court expresses: corporate
powers are to be exercised "primarily for the profit of the stockholders";
no other goals, no matter how broad their general community acceptance, may compete. But at the same time the passage, through its recognition of management's freedom to select the precise means to profit, the
• Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
I Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
2 Throughout this paper, the term "managers" will be used to refer, collectively, to the board of
directors and the officers of the corporation.
3 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
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quotation signals the inherent mushiness of these constraints as applied
to real-life fact situations. In the final analysis, considerable altruism
may be accomplished under the banner of "enlightened" profit
maximization.
At the level of the formal constraints, has much changed in the
sixty-seven years since the Dodge case? The bedrock principle of U.S.
corporate law remains that maximization of shareholder value is the
polestar for managerial decisionmaking. True, over the intervening
years, some room for incidental deviation has been formally permitted by
the cases and statutes.4 The state statutes empowering the corporation to
make charitable donations provide the most well-established example.'
But the amount of latitude these cases and statutes really concede is open
to some question. While the authorities to date are too sparse to permit
meaningful assessment of just how far the corporation may go in improving the world at the expense of its shareholders, it could have been said
with confidence, as recently as ten years ago, that little exists to suggest
that the level of expenditures contemplated by these express authorizations rises to what an accountant would describe as material in relation
to the corporation's overall financial condition. The recent discussion of
management's discretion to consider the interests of various nonshareholder constituencies in responding to takeover proposals, and the
statutes seeking to codify that discretion,6 have called that conclusion
into question. It is possible that these developments may result in a thorough rethinking of management's role in balancing the financial interests
of shareholders against competing social goals, and the prospects of such
rethinking have led one respected commentator to describe this as "the
golden age of corporate law." 7 But, at present, the lasting impact of
these developments upon the general philosophy of U.S. corporate law
remains to be seen.
These recent developments aside, however, it seems that most of the
day-to-day game of corporate social responsibility is not being played on
the field of the express authorizations. It is the second dimension of the
Dodge passage quoted above-the recognition of management's discretion to determine the best way to accomplish the goal of maximizing
4 Even by the time of the Dodge case, some courts had begun to uphold the corporation's power
to expend assets or sacrifice profits for philanthropic, humanitarian, or public welfare purposes, but
required-at the very minimum-that the objective of the expenditure be incidental and conducive
to the purposes for which the corporation was formed., In Dodge, the court acknowledged several of
such cases cited by Ford, but distinguished them, stating: "The difference between an incidental
humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for the benefit of employees, like the building of a
hospital for their use and the employment of agencies for the betterment of their condition, and a
general purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the expense of others, is obvious." Id. at 506-07, 170
N.W. at 684.
5 These cases and statutes are discussed infra in section 4.

6

These statutes are discussed infra in subsection 3.3.3.

See 17 SEC. REG. & L. RP. (BNA) 1830-32 (Oct. 18, 1985) (remarks of Bayless Manning at
24th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute).
7
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shareholder value-that realistically makes the greatest contribution to
management's latitude to further noninvestor social goals. The obvious
reason for this is that, under the traditional position represented by
Dodge, the touchstone for permissible management decisionmaking consists entirely of a subjective, state-of-mind test-was management motivated by the objective of profiting the shareholders?-and there is no
practical way to require that management's true motives for the decision
be placed on the record. While it is often possible to make plausible
inferences about the underlying motive for a decision from its content,
this invokes the image of courts scrutinizing the quality of managerial
decisionmaking, which runs hard up against another bedrock principle of
American corporate law: the business judgment rule. In this sense it may
be said that Mr. Ford's legal setbacks were due not so much to the substance of what he wanted to do as to the transparency of his motives for
wanting to do it. The court observed:
The record, and especially the testimony of Mr. Ford, convinces that
he has to some extent the attitude towards shareholders of one who has
dispensed and distributed to them large gains and that they should be
content to take what he chooses to give. His testimony creates the
impression, also, that he thinks the Ford Motor Company has made
too much money, has had too large profits, and that although large
profits might still be earned, a sharing of them with the public by reducing the price of the output of the company, ought to be undertaken.
We have no doubt that certain sentiments, philanthropic and altruistic,
creditable to Mr. Ford, had large influence in determining the policy to
be pursued by the Ford Motor Company - the policy which has been
herein referred to.s
Where does that leave us? Given the law's reluctance to look too
critically behind a business decision framed in traditional, for-profit
terms, any evaluation of management's latitude to deviate from the
straight-and-narrow of profiting shareholders necessarily becomes somewhat artificial if it is confined to those authorities expressly sanctioning
such deviation for its own sake. These likely represent but a small fraction of the total universe of corporate generosity. After all, why would
corporate counsel cavalierly neglect the opportunity to create a record of
all the economic benefits to the corporation of a decision that, in the
process, furthers some social objective? As a result, the cases presenting
the issue of deviation-for-its-own-sake will typically consist of situations
where (i) the prospect of shareholder benefit is so remote that it is not
even advanced; (ii) an expression of management's true motives somehow comes to light (as was apparently the case in Dodge); (iii) the facts
8 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. at 505-06, 170 N.W. at 683-84. Despite that, Mr. Ford
still prevailed on some issues. The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the lower court order requiring
the company to distribute approximately one-half of its earned surplus to the shareholders as a
special dividend, but it declined to interfere with Ford's proposed expansion of the business and
reversed the lower court on this point.
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are being used as a test case; or, and probably most frequently (iv) the
deviation-for-its-own-sake rationale is advanced only as an add-on to
other for-profit rationales, which might be sufficient in and of themselves.
The upshot of all this is that the assessment of management's power
to sacrifice shareholder value in the interest of some greater good should
properly take the form of two questions. First, to what extent does that
power exist, sub rosa, by way of management's capacity to put a forprofit wrapper on a decision truly influenced by altruistic considerations,
and then to protect that decision from scrutiny through the business
judgment rule? Second, to what extent is this discretion then expanded
(or contracted) by openly attributing the decision, in whole or in part, to
that true (altruistic) motivation?
Much of the discussion on these points requires either speculation or
extensive extrapolation from a very few published decisions.' The literature on the general subject of corporate social responsibility is vast, but
almost all of it deals exclusively with normative questions. The material
on what the law really is, as opposed to what it should be, is quite thin.
In addition, the ready availability of the business judgment rule has
spared the legal system the need to develop a cohesive position on why
managers should be permitted to stray from the confines of profit
maximization.
Notwithstanding the general drought of authority on the issues embraced by this paper, an important attempt to articulate the relevant
rules was recently made through the American Law Institute's Principles
of Corporate Governance project. Part II of that project, which was one
of the parts tentatively approved by the full Institute in May 1984,10 is
entitled "The Objective and Conduct of the Business Corporation" and
represents the first serious effort to detail the law in this area in a systematic fashion. It consists of a single section, which provides:
§ 2.01. The Objective and Conduct of the Business Corporation
A business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain, except that, whether or not corporate profit and shareholder gain are thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of
its business
(a) is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act
within the boundaries set by law,
9 Cf

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01

comment a, at 25-26 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984) [hereinafter A.L.I. PRiNCIPLEs-TD#2]:
Comparison with present law. Present law on the matters within the scope of § 2.01 [relating to the objective and conduct of the business corporation] cannot be stated with precision, because the case law is evolving and not entirely harmonious, while the statutes cover
only some of the relevant issues and leave open significant questions even as to the issues
they do cover. However, there is direct or indirect authoritative support for all of the
principles embodied in § 2.01.
10 See 61 A.L.I. PROC. 511 (1984).
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(b) may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business,
and
wel(c) may devote a reasonable amount of resources to public
1
fare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes. '
Extensive reference to this provision, and to the comments and illustrations accompanying it, will be made throughout this paper.
The organization of the balance of this paper is as follows. Section 2
will comment on some aspects of the normative debate over whether corporations should be permitted to give away shareholder value in the pursuit of some social goal. Section 3 will consider management's discretion
to pursue nonshareholder interests in the formulation of business and
operating policy, both in the name of profit under the business judgment
rule and under express statutory and judicial authorization. The section
will also consider the limited extent to which management is actually
required to subordinate shareholder gain to other objectives. Section 4
will then review the specific setting in which managerial discretion to
devote shareholder resources to competing goals has received the most
attention by the legislatures and the courts: charitable and philanthropic
donations.
SECTION 2
NORMATIVE DEBATE: SHOULD THE CORPORATION BE
"RESPONSIBLE"?

"By pursuing his own interest [the individual] frequently promotes
that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to
trade for the public good."
-

2.1

Adam Smith

The Wealth of Nations12

INTRODUCTION

By now, the notion that the business corporation, particularly the
large public corporation, may conduct its activities with a view to the
public good seems firmly woven into the fabric of public opinion.
Against the classical view espoused in the Dodge case in the 1920s, the
economic woes of the 1930s brought the very essence of the capitalistic
system into question, with the result that the business corporation was
called upon to assume some responsibility for the overall financial health
11 A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01. For the text of § 2.01 as modified by
changes adopted by the A.L.I., see Schwartz, Defining the CorporateObjective. Section 2.01 of the
A.L's Principles. 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 511, 512 n.4 (1984).
12 A. SMmTH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. IV, ch. II, at 423 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (1st ed.
1776).
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of the nation, almost as a matter of self-preservation. Later, the post-war
industrial boom period created a margin of corporate affluence that managers were willing to share with constituencies in addition to the shareholders. Thus, a tradition of corporate voluntarism was already well in
place when the social and political disquiet of the late 1960s and early
1970s again directed criticism at the public corporation and called for its
management to make a social accounting. The arguments on behalf of
corporate altruism that have emerged as a result of these events are, no
doubt, quite familiar to any reader of this paper.13 And over the last
roughly fifty years they have come to gain what is by now repeated acceptance by both courts1 4 and legislatures. 5
Sometimes these considerations are framed in obligatory terms"social responsibility." This line of reasoning-which presumably has
the large corporation implicitly in mind-has a kind of noblesse oblige
cast to it, based on the vastness of the discretionary resources at the corporation's command and the sheer volume of human activity likely affected by whatever business decisions its management happens to make.
Justifications are also premised on the corporation's "enlightened
self-interest." Under this heading are activities or expenditures that
serve to enhance the health, morale or education of the corporation's
work force, the quality of life in the communities where it operates, or
simply its general public image; all to the benefit of the corporation over
the long-term. Enlightened self-interest reasoning is also employed to
support the corporation's undertaking to address, on its own initiative,
social problems either caused by its activities (such as environmental pollution) or closely related to them (such as hiring of minorities) in the
interests of heading off negative publicity, scrutiny and attacks by powerful interest groups and possible governmental intervention. As has often
been pointed out,16 social responsibility of this genre, if the rationales be
taken at face value, does not really call for altruistic sacrifice but rather
more astute profit maximization, in the sense of identifying opportunities
whose aggregate return to the corporation over a sufficiently expansive
time horizon warrants the immediate expenditure. Be that as it may,
many of the activities advocated through such reasoning present prospective payoffs whose amounts, given the risky uncertainty attached to their
13 The reasons traditionally given by business for its obligation to exercise some social conscience are reviewed in Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U.L. REv.
157, 161-66 (1970).
14 See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 149-54, 161, 98 A.2d 581, 583-86, 590,
appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
15 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(e) (West 1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156 B, § 9(k)
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1979); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (McKinney 1986) (all grant the
corporation express power to make donations for the public welfare or similar purposes, irrespective
of any benefit to the corporation).
16 See, e.g., H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, THE MODERN CORPORATION & SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (1972) (Marine lecture); Engel, An Approach to CorporateSocial Responsibility, 32 STAN.
L. REv. 1, 9 (1979).
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realization, raise serious doubt that the project would ever be seriously
considered if it were purely a business deal.17
In addition to these arguments, there is the pragmatic recognition
that given the overall dominance of the corporate sector, we simply cannot permit the internal logic of corporate law to screen the resources of
this sector from appeals to conscience, if we are to retain our preference
for decentralized and privately initiated philanthropy. This is evident in
the Supreme Court of New Jersey's opinion in the leading case upholding
the corporation's power to make philanthropic donations:
Control of economic wealth has passed largely from individual entrepreneurs to dominating corporations, and calls upon the corporations
for reasonable philanthropic donations have come to be made with increased public support.
When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the hands of individuals they discharged their responsibilities as citizens by donating
freely for charitable purposes. With the transfer of most of the wealth
to corporate hands and the imposition of heavy burdens of individual
taxation, they have been unable to keep pace with increased philanthropic needs. They have therefore, with justification, turned to corporations to assume the modem
18 obligations of good citizenship in the
same manner as humans do.
2.2

THE CASE AGAINST CORPORATE VOLUNTARISM

The notion of the corporation's right to use shareholder resources
for the benefit of others seems so well entrenched in our current thinking
that most of the serious commentary over the last twenty years assumes
the existence of this right as a given. Nonetheless, much-probably the
preponderance-of this literature either criticizes the propriety of this
right or counsels restraint in its exercise, and as a result reflects a rare
coalition between the defenders of pure-form free enterprise on the right
and the critics of big business power on. the left. The arguments advanced in this literature may be clustered into three groups.
17

See, eg., SEC

DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE Ac-

96th Cong., 2d Sess. 268 (Comm. Print 1980) (quoting hearing witness as saying
that the economic impact of the corporation's social performance "is so long range as to be in the
real world, negligible"); H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, supra note 16, at 55 (Wallich lecture)
(" '[E]nlightened self-interest' tends to become a catchall phrase for a lot of things that redound to
the benefit of the corporation, but which have no basis whatever in a cost-benefit calculation.");
Schwartz, supra note 11, at 516 (noting that courts, when justifying managerial decisions based on
long-term profits, have not really asked whether discounted present value of those profits exceed
present cost).
18 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. at 150, 153, 98 A.2d at 584, 585-86, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953); see also A.L.I. PIuNCIPLES-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment i, at
40 (invoking this rationale); Mundheim, A Comment on the Social Responsibilitiesof Life Insurance
Companies as Investors, 61 VA. L. REv. 1247, 1256 & n.23 (1975).
COUNTABILITY,
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2.2.1 Economic Efficiency
The first group deals with economic efficiency. The foremost social
responsibility of business in our market economy, it is argued, is to produce and market desired goods and services in the most efficient and
competitive way possible, which in the process will create jobs for labor,
markets for suppliers, satisfaction for consumers and profits for the
shareholders. By voluntarily holding its prices to sub-market-clearing
levels or assuming responsibility for extraneous social programs as a part
of its production or overhead costs, the corporation departs from this
goal and contributes to an overall misallocation of resources.19
One type of social responsibility that may present an exception to
this argument, however, relates to "negative externalities," that is, costs
directly resulting from the corporation's operations that are borne by
third parties rather than the corporation.?° Environmental pollution is
the widely cited example. If, for whatever reason (the state of the substantive law, costs of litigation or some other factor), the corporation
bears no financial responsibility for such side effects and therefore does
not take them into account in production and pricing decisions, then the
true costs of its output are being understated. Production is, in effect,
being subsidized and the resulting price is artificially low. Thus, the case
may be made that voluntary action by the corporation to "internalize"
these costs by either restricting its pollution or compensating the victims-whichever is cheaper to the corporation-will actually enhance
rather than distort efficient resource allocation. Critics of this argument
have pointed to the practical difficulties involved in the corporation correctly identifying and measuring all of the byproduct costs of its activities2 1 and to the more fundamental underlying questions such as why free
use of the air or water should be deemed in the first instance to be an
entitlement of the pollution victims rather than the corporation.2 2 In
addition, there is the overarching issue of whether the decision to invoke
this kind of comparative welfare calculus shouldn't properly be left to a
public body-court, legislature or administrative agency-that is
charged with representing the interests of all parties concerned.2 3
19 See, e.g., Rostow, To Whom andfor What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?, in
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 47, 63-67 (E. Mason ed. 1960).
20 See ag., H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, supra note 16, at 49-50 (Wallich lecture); Arrow, Gifts
and Exchanges, in ALTRUISM, MORALIrY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 13, 20-22 (E. Phelps ed. 1975)
(discussing information on product quality as an example).
21 See, eg., Demsetz, Social Responsibility in the EnterpriseEconomy, 10 Sw. U.L. REv. 1, 4-5
(1978); Engel, supra note 16, at 52-53.
22 See, eg., Demsetz, supra note 21, at 5; Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1270 (1982).
23 See Engel, supra note 16, at 2, 27-85. The legislature always enjoys the power to compel the
corporation to internalize some or all of the social costs of its activities by imposing financial penalties upon the underlying conduct. Why, therefore, should corporate managers voluntarily assume
responsibility for some social activity when the legislature-the institution entrusted with the basic
task of balancing competing social interests and carrying out the public will-has not seen fit to lay
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Corporate social responsibility in the form of internalizing positive
externalities presents a much more troublesome case from the standpoint
of allocative efficiency. Positive externalities represent benefits resulting
from corporate expenditures that are conferred on or shared by persons
other than the corporation.24 Were an automobile manufacturing corporation to establish an extensive education and training program for the
hard-core unemployed, for example, it would participate directly in some
of the benefits by having better trained employees, but benefits would
redound as well to the employees themselves, their subsequent employers
and the general community. In a strictly for-profit decision the corporation would take into account only those benefits it stands to receive itself
in determining whether the cost of the program is justified. This will

likely lead to an "underinvestment" in job training from a total societal
view and, as a result, management might decide (altruistically) to internalize some of these third-party benefits in considering whether to undertake the program. The excess of the costs of the program over its direct
benefit to the corporation will then be passed through to consumers in
the form of higher car prices and to company shareholders in the form of
lower profits. Besides the just-distribution point of why these two groups
should be billed for benefits received by others, 5 there is the misallocation aspect that the job training program has inflated the costs of producing automobiles. Therefore, at the margin, some persons who would
have purchased cars or invested in the company's shares, had the comthis activity at the corporation's doorstep? Mr. Engel's article contains an intricate exploration of
this theme. See also C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 74-75 (1975); H. MANNE & H. WALLICH,
supra note 16, at 42 (Wallich lecture); id at 100-02 (colloquy between Professors Aschheim and
Wallich) (all discussing the problem of discerning social consensus and determining the appropriate
trade off between shareholder wealth and public good in the absence of legislative guidance). But see
Weiss, Social Regulation ofBusiness Activity: Reforming the CorporateGovernance System to Resolve
an InstitutionalImpasse, 28 UCLA L. REv. 343, 379-81 (1981) (suggesting that corporate managers
are better equipped than government regulators to address externalities); cf C. STONE, supra,at 93110 (criticizing the adequacy of the law as a complete substitute for corporate-initiated social
responsibility).
24 For general discussions of the positive externality problem see Baumol, Enlightened Self.
Interestand CorporatePhilanthropy,in A NEW RATIONALE FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL POLICY 1, 1118 (1970); H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, supra note 16, at 49-54 (Wallich lecture).
25 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 397 (3d ed. 1986) (fact that consumers bear
some costs of corporation's social responsibility represents regressive taxation); Mashaw, Corporate
Social Responsibility: Comments on the Legal and Economic Context of a Continuing Debate, 3
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 114, 122-23 (1984). In response to the point made in the text, it has been
argued that the shareholder's interests inevitably extend beyond the narrow economic fate of the
particular corporation in which he or she happens to own shares. Accordingly, the shareholder
should properly be seen as the owner of a "diversified portfolio" of claims and obligations. In this
capacity, the shareholder may well participate in the external benefits produced by the corporation
by virtue of his or her other diverse roles such as shareholder in other corporations, consumer of
goods and services, taxpayer, breather of the air and so forth. See Wallich & McGowan, Stockholder

Interestand the Corporation'sRole in SocialPolicy, in A NEW RATIONALE
POLICY 39 (1970).

FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL
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pany's expenses been limited to the direct costs of doing business, will
spend their money on other things.
2.22

Corporate Managers as Arbiters of the Social Welfare

The second cluster of criticisms involves the propriety of corporate
management assuming the responsibility for social welfare calculations.
Two basic questions are raised. The first is one of ability and qualifications: Is there any reason to assume that senior corporate executives, by
virtue of their typical backgrounds and experience, will possess the skill
and perspective necessary to carry out the role of social policymaker?2 6
Even if so, how are the efforts of the diverse corporate managements who
choose to assume this policymaking role to be coordinated? With both
the choice of goals and the means to achieve them diffused among countless independent corporate decisionmakers, there is a serious risk of not
only duplicated but also conflicting efforts.27
Second, there are the basic philosophical questions of legitimacy and
accountability. Necessarily, the executive' decision to apply corporate
resources to the solution of social problems, and the selection of which
problems to address, has implications extending beyond the corporation
and its shareholders to a variety of other groups within society. Thus,
the welfare of these groups is in the hands of a decisionmaker who they
had no say in selecting and over whom they have no control. What standards exist to guide the executive in balancing the competing interests of
these social groups? And, in the absence of clear-cut standards,
shouldn't this task of setting social priorities be reserved to persons who
28
dre accountable to all impacted groups through the political process?
In sum, these questions reflect the belief that once the corporate
manager steps outside the traditional role of business expert appointed by
the shareholders to maximize profits on their behalf, he or she loses-in a
26 See, eg., Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation,62 COLUM. L. REV.
399, 414 (1962); Tabor, Let Corporation Law Stick to Its Last, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE 270, 271 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979); see also C. STONE, supranote 23,
at 85-86 (discussing and responding to the argument); Fischel, supra note 22, at 1285 (discussing
independent directors). But see Andrews, Public Resonsibility in the Private Corporation,20 J. INDUS. ECON. 135, 141-42 (1972) (competence to deal with social problems can be developed through
education and experience).
27 See Manne, supra note 26, at 416; H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, supra note 16, at 31 (Manne
lecture) (example of corporation's abstention from pollution while others continue to pollute).
28 See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM 133-34 (1962); Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32, 33,
122. See also C. STONE, supra note 23, at 86 (discussing and responding to Friedman's argument);
R. POSNER, supra note 25, at 396; Brudney, The Independent Director-HeavenlyCity or Potemkin
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REv. 597, 639-43 (1982); Clark, What Is the ProperRole of the Corporation?,
in PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 195, 209-10 (1984); Engel, supra note 16, at 30-31; Lewis, Economics by Admonition, 49 AM. ECON. REv., Annual Mtg. Papers, 384, 394-96 (1959); Rostow, supra
note 19, at 68. These concerns are aggravated when, as often may be the case, the cost of the
corporation's social responsibility are borne by its employees or customers rather than its shareholders. See Mashaw, supra note 25, at 122-23. Cf Mundheim, supra note 18, at 1255-57.
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sense, renounces-the basic justifications for being entrusted with vast
discretionary power over the corporation's resources in the first place.
2.2.3

Lack of EnforceableStandards

The final concern is the void in control over corporate and managerial conduct that would result from permitting management to freely
choose among goals other than shareholder gain. This was the subject of
the celebrated Berle-Dodd dialogue, written during the depression years
of the 1930s, when the role of the free enterprise system generally was up
for debate.29 Professor Dodd initiated the dialogue in response to a 1931
article by Professor Berle,30 in which Berle advocated the imposition of
trustee-like obligations on corporate managers in transactions affecting
shareholder interests. Dodd wrote that, while he was in general sympathy with Berle's attempts to restrict management from diverting the
shareholders' profits into its own pockets, he thought it undesirable in so
doing to give increased emphasis to the notion that business corporations
exist solely to make profits for their shareholders .3 He added his belief
that:
public opinion, which ultimately makes law, has made and is today
making substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business
corporation as an economic institution which has a social service as
well as a profit-making function, that this view has already had some
effect upon legal theory, and that it is likely to have a greatly increased
effect upon the latter in the near future.32
In support of his thesis, Dodd cited statements by business leaders and
scholars, what he saw as the increased judicial willingness to allow corporate management broad discretion as to what policies best promote the
interests of shareholders, and the growth of corporate charitable giving.
Berle replied that Dodd's views represented theory, not practice.
He argued that those in control of corporations did not assume responsibility for the community at large and that there was no mechanism for
enforcing this responsibility upon them:
Now I submit that you can not abandon emphasis on "the view that
business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for
their shareholders" until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear
and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone
29 Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HRv. L. REv. 1049 (1931); Dodd, For
Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1932); Berle, For Whom CorporateManagersAre Trustees"A Note, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement
of the FiduciaryDuties of Corporate ManagersPracticable?,2 U. CHI. L. REv. 194 (1935); see also
Dodd, Book Review, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 538, 546-47 (1942); A. BERLE, THE 20TM CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954); Berle, Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY at
xii (E. Mason ed. 1960).
30 Berle, supra note 29, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
31 Dodd, supra note 29, 45 HARV. L. REV. at 1147-48.
32 Id. at 1148.

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 13:7 1988

else.... Either you have a system based on individual ownership of
property or you do not. If not-and there are at the moment plenty of
reasons why capitalism does not seem ideal-it becomes necessary to
present a system (none has been presented) of law or government, or
both, by which responsibility for control of national wealth and income
is so apportioned and enforced that the community as a whole, or at
least the great bulk of it, is properly taken care of. Otherwise the economic power now mobilized and massed under the corporate form, in
the hands of a few thousand directors, and the few hundred individuals
holding "control" is simply handed over, weakly, to the present administrators
with a pious wish that something nice will come out of it
33
all.

Thus, Berle's objection to Dodd's thesis was not a concern for the preservation of the profit-maximization standard per se, but rather the fear
that, if "reformed," it would be replaced by a toothless ideal, with the
likely result being simply an expansion of management's unfettered
discretion.3 4
The absence of enforceable standards raises substantive concerns at
two levels. The first is a general socio-economic concern for controls
over corporate power. Requiring that each corporate undertaking be
profit-motivated, that is that it be rationalized as presenting a positive
return on investment greater than the corporation's cost of capital, and
greater than the return available from alternative undertakings, necessarily supplies a key check on any expansion of the large corporations' general role within society.35
At another level, and more central to the themes of this paper, are
the implications for traditional fiduciary law notions of managerial ac33 Berle, supra note 29, 45 HARV. L. REv. at 1367-68 (footnote omitted).
34 In a sense, each man ultimately conceded the other's position. Writing three years later,
Dodd held to the view that a doctrine defining the business corporation's sole function as obtaining
maximum profits for its shareholders could not be expected to appeal strongly either to managers as
acode of professional ethics or to the community as sound social policy. And, foreseeing the ultimate development of the law, he argued that the time had come for courts, in upholding corporate
contributions to charity or provision of employee benefits, to recognize expressly the corporation's
social obligations rather than rely upon the premise that such actions make for greater profits over
the long run. Dodd, supra note 29, 2 U. CH. L. REv. at 206-07 n.30. But he admitted that Berle
was correct in observing that no legal principles then existed to compel managers to serve the interests of persons other than investors. Id. at 205-06. Thus, he grudgingly concluded that "[p]rofitmaking for absentee owners must be the legal standard by which we measure [managers'] conduct
until some other legal standard has been evolved." Id. at 206.
Berle, on the other hand, admitted many years later that public and legal opinion had come to
accept Professor Dodd's characterization of managerial responsibility. A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954). As to the implications of this for managerial discretion, he made the somewhat ominous observation that "the only real control which guides or limits
[the large, institutional corporations'] economic and social action is the real, though undefined and
tacit, philosophy of the men who compose them." Id. at 180.
35 For a somewhat alarmist view of the threat posed by corporate voluntarism to our pluralistic
society, see Levitt, The Dangers of Social Responsibility, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1958, at 41,
44-47.
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countability. Berle's concern in his 1932 response to Dodd was that permitting management to be "socially responsible" in the absence of
enforceable directives was a one-way street: a net increase in discretion
without a matching increase in responsibility, with the result simply that
management would have an easier time justifying whatever it chose to do
with the shareholders' money.3 6 Thus viewed, the social responsibility
debate becomes not one between "society" on one side and "the corporation" (management and shareholders) on the other in a battle over the
corporation's property, but one between management, acting in the name
of society, on the one side and the shareholders on the other in a battle
over the shareholders' property.
SECTION 3
SOURCES OF MANAGEMENT'S DISCRETION TO CONSIDER INTERESTS

OTHER THAN SHAREHOLDER GAIN IN THE FORMULATION
OF BUSINESS AND OPERATING POLICY

This section considers the general principles that govern management's discretion to take considerations other than shareholder wealth
maximization into account in making business and operating decisions.
It is divided into three subsections. The first examines management's
discretion to entertain those interests, covertly, in the guise of enlightened profit maximization. The second explores the extent to which the
law has evolved, in the days since Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,37 to permit
management to premise its decisions, overtly, on the interests of groups
other than its shareholders. Both of these sections deal with what is permissible for management to do, should it choose to do so. The final subsection analyzes when it is mandatory for management to subordinate
the enhancement of shareholder gain to other objectives.
3.1

DISCRETION IN THE NAME OF PROFIT AND THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE

3.L1

Introduction
Perhaps the most candid way to describe the response of U.S. law to
the issue of management's freedom to be socially responsible in the conduct of its business is that the law has found it most convenient to look
the other way. By this means, the formal integrity of the proposition that
management's obligation is to maximize value for the shareholders is preserved, while management enjoys considerable de facto power to be altruistic with the shareholders' money.
Explaining this response, first and foremost, is the recognition that
in the large public corporation, decentralization of decisionmaking
36 See 59 A.L.I. PRoC. 429-32 (1982) (comments of Dean David Ruder on accountability concerns raised by section 2.01(c) of A.L.I. Principlesof Corporate Governance).
37 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
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means that many social responsibility decisions do not reach the level of
senior management and therefore go unnoticed by the outside world.38
Hiring low-skilled ghetto youths over the summer, establishing adult education programs for employees, voluntarily reducing the level of pollution, each of these everyday business decisions may be motivated in part
by voluntaristic considerations, but nonetheless go unchallenged because
they fail to come to the attention of dissident shareholders or the derivative suit bar unless the corporation itself trumpets them.3 9
3.1.2

The Business Judgment Rule and Wrigley

The principal legal device for sheltering everyday business decisions,
however, is the business judgment rule. As noted in section 1 above, the
combination of enlightened self-interest reasoning and the courts' unwillingness to second guess management means that management can typically supply some "for-profit" rationale to bolster its altruism. The
courts will then accept this rationale at face value to foreclose further
scrutiny.
The case most frequently cited as typifying this deferential attitude
of the courts is Shlensky v. Wrigley," in which a minority shareholder in
the corporation that owned and operated the Chicago Cubs baseball
team brought a derivative suit challenging management's failure to install lights at Wrigley Field. Without the lights, the Cubs were required
to play all their home games during the day and, therefore, the plaintiff
alleged, forgo the greater receipts available from playing games during
the week at night. 4 ' The plaintiff attributed this policy to the personal
preferences of Philip K. Wrigley, president and a director of the corporation and owner of approximately 80% of its stock. Specifically, the
plaintiff alleged that Wrigley resisted installing lights because of his belief
that baseball was a daytime sport and his concern over the possible detrimental effect on the predominantly residential neighborhood surrounding the ballpark, and that Wrigley had elevated these considerations over
the financial interests of the corporation.4 2
38 Cf Chirelstein, Corporate Law Refonn, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS
PREDICAMENT 41, 52 (J. McKie ed. 1974) (implying that business decisions that involve production
techniques, research, marketing or product characteristics are rarely sufficiently visible to invite
attack).
39 If the corporation does publicize these activities, it then may justify them as motivated in
part by the traditional for-profit interests of public relations. See infra note 56 and accompanying
text.
40 Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968).
41 As an indication that during the week, night games were generally viewed as more profitable
than day games, the plaintiff alleged that every major league club other than the Cubs scheduled
substantially all of its home games at night, except for opening day, weekends and holidays. In
addition, the plaintiff alleged that the Cubs weekend attendance figures were similar to those of the
Chicago White Sox, but the White Sox weeknight games drew many more patrons than the Cubs
weekday games. Id. at 175-76, 237 N.E.2d at 777-78.
42 Id. at 176-77, 237 N.E.2d at 778.
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The court, however, held for the defendants and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Relying on the business judgment rule, it noted that
the directors' motives, as alleged in the complaint, "showed no fraud,
illegality or conflict of interest."4 3 It reasoned that the motives the plaintiff attributed to Wrigley and the other directors were not necessarily
contrary to the best interests of the corporation, in that any deterioration
of the neighborhood might affect the willingness of fans to attend the
ballpark or the value of the ballpark as real estate. And while the directors' unwillingness to install lights for these reasons might not have been
the "correct" decision, correctness of business decisionmaking was not a
matter for the courts to assess. 44
This reasoning led the reporters for the Principlesof Corporate Governance-willingto call a spade a spade-to cite Shlensky v. Wrigley as
evidence that, on occasion, "the courts have in effect conclusively presumed that the utilization [of corporate resources] was for a profit-maximizing purpose, even where the evidence looked the other way."'4 5
There are, to be sure, certain aspects of the case that may make it sui
generis. The first is the 80% stake of the principal shareholder. In corporate law theory, the controlling shareholder's right to self-indulgence
ceases when he or she sells one share to an outsider." Thus, the fiduciary obligations imposed on the 99.9% shareholder should be no less rigorous than those of the hired manager with 0.1% of the shares. While
this may reflect business reality in the case of outright self-dealing, it is
not the way business people-or, for that matter, most minority shareholders-likely think with respect to milder forms of self-indulgence
such as the controlling shareholder's personal tastes and preferences as to
selection of personnel or matters of business policy. The business judgment rule provides an under-the-table means to reconcile these widely
shared expectations with corporate law orthodoxy.47 Further, the case
for managerial self-indulgence based on widely shared expectations is
strengthened considerably in a case like Wrigley given the nature of the
business at issue. Businesses such as professional sports franchises, theat43 Id. at 181, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
44 Id. at 180-81, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
45 A.L.I. PRINCPLE -TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 reporter's note 2, at 48.
46 This is, in effect, a by-product of the principle that unanimous shareholder consent is required to foreclose judicial review of an alleged waste of corporate assets. See, eg., Rogers v. Hill,
289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 478, 184 A.2d 602, 605 (1962); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 17-18, 99 N.E. 138, 142 (1912); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02 reporter's note 6, at 55 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1986) [hereinafter A.L.I. PRINCIPLE -TD#5]. As a result, courts have been liberal in permitting a
sole shareholder to deal freely with corporate assets or opportunities, free of traditional fiduciary
restrictions. See, eg., Martin v. Kagan (In re Tufts Elecs., Inc.), 746 F.2d 915, 918 (1st Cir. 1984);
Anderson v. Benson, 394 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
47 I have written elsewhere about the role of the business judgment rule in sheltering these and
other types of "bargained-for opportunism" by managers. See Davis, JudicialReview of Fiduciary
Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 75-82 (1985).
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rical productions, newspapers and radio and television broadcasting offer
the persons in control opportunities for nonpecuniary benefits, in the
form of pleasure, prestige and influence, that often outweigh profits as a
motive for investment.4 8 At the same time, these businesses by their nature have a distinct form of influence on the community, which makes
them in some sense public utilities, with the result that courts may be
especially willing to protect longstanding managerial policies, on which
the community has come to depend, from the demands of wealth maximization for the benefit of shareholders.49
Finally, events following the Wrigley decision may corroborate the
basic wisdom of the "management knows best" premise that underlies
the business judgment rule. In June 1981 the Wrigley family sold the
Cubs to the corporation that operates the Chicago Tribune. When Tribune Company management then began discussing the possibility of lighting Wrigley Field to accommodate night baseball, both the state of
Illinois and50 the city of Chicago moved quickly to enact legislation to
prevent it.
3.1.3

Business Judgment and Enlightened Self-Interest Generally

The foregoing comments notwithstanding, the Wrigley case reveals
the inherent limitations of corporate law's capacity to review managerial
decisionmaking in situations where management's motives are complex
and mixed, as they will often be in the case of enlightened self-interest
activity. This subsection will consider, in more detail, the hurdles to developing meaningful limits on management's discretion to pass off voluntarism as enlightened long-term profitmaking, given the mechanics of the
business judgment rule.
As a focal point for this analysis, let us consider the formulation of
the business judgment rule adopted by the A.L.I. Principlesof Corporate
Governance, which requires that the decisionmaker "rationally believe[ ]
48 Cf.Demsetz & Lehn, The Structure of CorporateOwnership: Causesand Consequences, 93 J.
POL.ECON. 1155, 1161-62, 1167-68, 1170-71 (1985) (given the greater potential for consumption of
firm-specific amenities in professional sports clubs or mass media firms, ownership structure is more
concentrated in order to permit owners to take full advantage).
49 See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1091, 1094-95, 1097 (10th Cir. 1972) (directors and officers of corporation publishing metropolitan newspaper have obligations to employees
and public as well as to shareholders). Consider, for example, the likely response of a New York
court to a hypothetical minority shareholder of the Brooklyn Dodgers who, had Waiter O'Malley
changed his mind in 1958 and decided to keep the team in Brooklyn out of loyalty to its fans,
challenged O'Malley's failure to take advantage of the admittedly higher long-term profitability of
the Los Angeles market.
5o See Illinois Environmental Protection Act § 25, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I11 1/2, § 1025
(Smith-Hurd 1986); CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE § 104.1-14.1 (enacted 1983); see also Chicago Nat'l
League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill.
2d 357, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (1985) (upholding this legislation against constitutional challenge).
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that his business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation."'"
The reference to the best interests of the corporation implicitly embodies
the philosophy of the first clause of section 2.01 of the Principlesthat the
corporation conduct its activities "with a view to enhancing corporate
profit and shareholder gain."52 Thus, under the A.L.I. formulation, the
court's review process comes down to a two-step inquiry: Does management subjectively believe that its decision will enhance corporate profit
and shareholder gain and is that belief rational?5 3 As the following subsections will explore, both inquiries put severe strains on the institutional
competence of the courts.
3.L3.1

The Subjective Belief Component

Often, the only evidence of management's motivation will be what
management proclaims it to be, a realization that creates obvious limits
on what can be expected from the subjective belief component of the test.
Consider, in this regard, an illustration included in the commentary to
section 2.01 of the Principlesof Corporate Governance. 4 Its facts involve
a publicly held corporation engaged in the operation of a chain of small
moderately priced restaurants. The holder of a fifty-percent controlling
stock interest in the corporation dies, and her stock passes to her grandson, a vegetarian who believes it is improper to eat meat or fish. Because
of these beliefs, he converts the restaurants to vegetarian menus, even
though "it is admitted that the conversion will reduce [the corporation's]
profits on both a long-run and a short-run basis." The illustration concludes that this is in derogation of the corporate-profit and shareholdergain requirements of section 2.01.11
The critical fact in the illustration is that the grandson "admitted"
that he was imposing his personal dietary principles upon the corporation notwithstanding his appreciation of their negative impact on profits.
But the future profitability of alternative courses of action is frequently
open to debate. Had the grandson instead sought to justify the conversion as a means to take advantage of the significant portion of the dining
public who shared his views-customers who would likely be more attracted to a restaurant featuring an exclusively vegetarian menu than one
with only one or two vegetarian items-who is to say that this was not
his true motivation for the change? In other words, in the absence of
"smoking gun" evidence on the point, as contained in the illustration and
51PRINCIPLES

OF

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE:

ANALYSIS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 4.01(c)(3) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985) [hereinafter A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#4].
52 A.L.I. PRINCIPLEs-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01.
53 See A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#4, supra note 51, § 4.01(c) comment f, at 67.
54 A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment h, illustration 13. The illustration is included by the reporters to demonstrate the rule regarding ethical considerations, but indirectly serves the present inquiry as well.
55 Id. at 38-39.
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as apparently existed in the Dodge v. FordMotor Co. case, the subjective
motive requirement test will typically be within management's control.
Further, even if the grandson had made the admission, he might still
have an opportunity, if threatened with liability, to recant and place his
actions on a for-profit footing. He may, for example, be able to explain
away the statement as mere public relations, designed to cull the favor of
his prospective vegetarian clientele. He can then argue, ironically, that it
was actually more in line with the profit-motivation requirement to publicize his actions in the name of principle than in the name of profit.5 6
To generalize from the foregoing observations, we should recognize
that the courts' vulnerabilities on issues of subjective motive has been an
important factor in shaping the law's approach to reviewing fiduciary
decisionmaking.5 7 It consists of reducing the question to two strong presumptions, which underlie the familiar two-tier scope of review. If management has a pecuniary conflict of interest in the transaction, illicit
motivation is, in effect, presumed, and management will be required to
carry the burden of proof that the transaction is inherently fair.5" Absent
such a pecuniary stake, the law assumes that management shares a community of interest with the shareholders in the financial welfare of the
corporation. Thus, good faith motivation is presumed and the manager's
decision is protected by the business judgment rule.
While corporate law can respond vigorously to the prospect of
tainted motivation posed by a visible stake in the transaction, it typically
lacks the capacity to detect less tangible forms of inducements. Furthermore the area of corporate voluntarism is rich with the opportunities for
these nonpecuniary, or psychic, kinds of benefits. Whether the reward
comes in the form of serving on a school's or foundation's board of trustees, being invited to the Governor's office or simply being regarded by
one's peers and family as a concerned and thoughtful business citizen,
the personal rewards are undeniably present. Corporate social responsibility may also provide the executive with a means to avoid personal unpleasantry, whether in the form of pressure from charitable and
philanthropic organizations to make a contribution,5 9 demands from
public interest groups6 ° or the threat of negative publicity and public crit56 See H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, supra note 16, at 10-12 (Manne lecture); Friedman, supra

note 28, at 124.
57 See generally Davis, supra note 47, at 24-25, 42-44.
58 Pepper v. Linton, 308 U.S. 295, 308 (1939); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 71920 (Del. 1971); MODEL BusINESs CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(3) (1984) A.L.I. PRINCIPLS-TD#5, supra
note 46, § 5.02(a)(2)(A), (b).
59 See, e.g., Richards, Berkshire HathawayPleases Shareholdersby Letting Them EarmarkCorporate Gifts, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1983, at 37, col. 4 (quoting a letter to shareholders by Berkshire
Hathaway Corp. chairman Warren E. Buffett as noting that corporate "gifts tend to be based more
on who does the asking and how corporate peers are responding than on an objective evaluation of
the donee's activities").
60 Cf Langbein, Social Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments: Unprincipled,
Futile and Illegal,in DISINVESTMENT-Is IT LEGAL? IS IT MORAL? IS IT PRODuCTIVE? 1,8 (1985)
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icism.6 1 In all of these cases, the benefits inure to the executive himself or
herself, not to the corporation and its shareholders who fund them.6 2
For many ambitious or image-conscious senior executives, these kinds of
psychic rewards are likely to be at least as important as more conventional forms of compensation. And their existence compromises the validity of presuming that the executives' interests are aligned with the
shareholders, simply because he or she has no tangible conflict of

interest.
To be sure, opportunities for these kinds of psychic or indirect re-

wards exist across the scope of managerial activity, not only in the case

of social responsibility.6" But where these subtle conflicts of interest arise
out of more mainstream business operations, policing them necessarily
comes at the risk of chilling good faith entrepreneurial activity. In other
words, we may view the traditional ultra vires doctrine as representing,
like the inherent fairness test, an easy-to-administer response to the risk
of slippage by courts in discerning management's true motivation. Once
an activity is ultra vires, it is prohibited and proof of illicit motive becomes unnecessary. Thus, the determination whether to declare a form
of activity ultra vires should turn on a balancing of its business utility
against its prospect for giving rise to the kinds of subtle conflicts of interest that are likely to evade detection through judicial review or other
mechanisms, such as the market." The law's increased recognition, over
the years, of the corporation's enlightened social self-interest is, therefore, only one half of the inquiry, and its implementation necessarily
comes at the cost of a greater risk of managerial self-indulgence.
3.L3.2

The Objective Rationality Component

The objective rationality component of the test is not likely to be a
(discussing how separation of ownership and control leads to pressure on pension trustees by groups
that have failed to gain the assent of the political process). But see McKean, Economics of Trust,

Altruism, and CorporateResponsibility, in

ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY

29, 40-

41 (E. Phelps ed. 1975) (questioning the personal effects of social pressure on the corporation).
61 See Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 PUB. POL'Y 303, 316 (1973)
(observing that few individuals within a large corporation become so identified with its goals that
other social pressures become irrelevant); See Wetzel & Winokur, Corporationsand the Public Interest-A Review of the Corporate Purpose and Business Judgment Rules, 27 Bus. LAW. 235, 237
(1971).
62 See, e.g., H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, supra note 16, at 20-22, 25-27 (Manne lecture); Engel,
supra note 16, at 22-23 & n.65.
63 Familiar examples include on-the-job shirking, see, eg., Alchian & Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs and Economic Organization,62 Am. ECON. REv. 777, 780-81 (1972); Anderson,
Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairnessand CorporateStructure, 25 UCLA L. REv. 738, 758 n. 59
(1978), or engaging in some pet project or whim, see, e.g., Hall, Executive Style: For a Company
Chief, When There's a Whim There's Often a Way, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
64 A good illustration of the use of the ultra vires doctrine to foreclose opportunities where the
risk of improper motive is strong, and of the competing pull of business utility, is supplied by the
cases dealing with gratuitous payments to senior employees or their families. See infra subsection
4.2. On the role of the market as a disciplining mechanism, see generally infra subsection 3.2.
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source of great restrictiveness either. At what point will the courts be
willing to say that no rational person could believe that the potential
benefits to the corporation over time justify the cost? Given this standard, actions predicated on the corporation's enlightened self-interest
will be particularly immune from attack. If the plaintiff can ever overcome the presumption inherent in the business judgment rule, it is likely
to be in the something-for-nothing kind of case, where what the corporation got and what it gave up can both be specifically identified and compared.6 5 Where the gain to the corporation takes the form of elusive
commodities such as goodwill, public relations, employee morale or the
avoidance of governmental regulation, whose value over the years to
come is incapable of measurement, any such comparison is necessarily
quite speculative. While it may appear doubtful that the stream of benefits to be realized over time exceeds in present value to the corporation
the near-term cost, it is at the same time often impossible to say for certain that it will not, given a sufficiently expansive time horizon. And the
practical effect of the business judgment rule is that, absent such certainty, management wins.
Given this, many commentators have recognized that insofar as
some sort of long-term benefit to the corporation may be cited in almost
any instance where management interjects social responsibility considerations into its business and operating policy, the upshot of applying the
business judgment rule is to endow management with considerable everyday power to pursue social good as a quasi-corporate objective.6 6 In a
similar vein, the commentary to section 2.01 of the A.L.I. Principlesof
Corporate Governance endorses the enlightened self-interest concept and
observes that in most cases the kinds of conduct authorized by the three
"exceptions"-obedience to the law, pursuit of generally recognized ethical principles and devotion of a reasonable amount of resources to public
welfare, humanitarian, educational or philanthropic purposes-could be
pursued even under the general directive of corporate profit and shareholder gain.67
The reluctance of the A.L.I. reporters to speculate on what, if any,
realistic limits are embodied in the objective rationality component is
neatly revealed by the evolution of one of their illustrations. The initial
tentative draft of the Principles, released in 1982, contained a pair of il65 An example is the classic case of Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 696-700 (Sup. Ct. 1940),
where the court held that the directors of a banking corporation breached their duties by causing the
corporation to purchase convertible debentures at par and granting the sellers an option to repurchase them at the same price at the end of six months.
66 See, eg., Blumberg, supra note 13, at 205-08; Chirelstein, supra note 38, at 51-52; Clark,
supra note 28, at 200-01; Committee on Corporate Laws, Special Interest Directors, 35 REc. A. B.
CITy N.Y. 26, 32, 36 (1980); Engel, supra note 16, at 15-17; Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173, 183-84 (1981); Mundheim, supra note 18, at 1252;
Ruder, Public Obligationsof Private Corporations,114 U. PA. L. REv. 209, 215-24 (1965).
67 A.L.I. PRINcIPL s-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment f, at 28-29.
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lustrations involving a publicly held insurance company with annual
earnings of approximately $100 million. In the first of the illustrations,
its management decides to make 5% of the corporation's loans to finance
inner-city projects that do not meet its normal risk standards "based on a
belief that the continued health of the insurance industry depends on
maintaining the vitality of urban areas in which the industry lends, and
that some relaxation of traditional lending standards on the part of major
lenders is essential if this vitality is to be maintained." 68 Although this
program will reduce profits by an estimated $3 million annually (that is,
by 3%), management concludes that the present value of the increased
profits over the long-run exceeds this initial reduction, a conclusion
which the illustration upholds as consistent with the general economic
objective of section 2.01. In the second illustration, however, the innercity loans are increased to 40% of the corporation's portfolio, and its
anticipated reduction in profits is $24 million-certainly an extreme case
by any measure. Although management again makes a judgment that
the present value of the long-run gain exceeds the cost, the illustration
concludes that this decision is beyond the bounds of rationality6 9 and
therefore (presumably) not protected by the business judgment rule.
During the consideration of this tentative draft by the full Institute
in May 1982, however, the reporters' formulation of the business judgment rule came under criticism. District of Columbia attorney Lloyd N.
Cutler, who had served as one of the consultants to the reporters, pointed
to the second illustration above as an example and argued, notwithstanding its extreme facts, that he "cannot conceive that particular decision
lacks a rational basis."7 0 Both illustrations were then retained when section 2.01 was again set forth, with minor revisions, as part of Tentative
Draft No. 2 in 1984. While the first illustration was unchanged in substance, the facts of the second were revised to state that management
made no judgment that the corporation's economic interests would be
advanced by the program.7" As revised, therefore, the illustration was
stripped of any pretense of for-profit motivation-no matter how unsound-and thus the decision fails to satisfy even the more basic subjective belief requirement discussed in the previous subsection.
Besides demonstrating the difficulties courts might have in declaring
a particular enlightened self-interest calculation to be inherently irrational, even at the extremes, the redrafting of the illustrations also suggests what might be a more realistic form of judicial review in these
cases. While the traditional deference of the business judgment rule may
make courts unwilling to second guess the wisdom of the tradeoff management makes, it does not foreclose scrutiny of the decisionmaking pro68 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND REC-

OMMENDATIONS § 2.01 comment e, illustration 5, at 23 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982).
69 Id. illustration 6, at 24.
70 59 A.L.I. PROC. 517 (1982).

71 A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment f, illustration 6, at 32.
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cess that led to it. The recent decisions in Smith v. Van Gorkom 72 and
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.73 establish that directors

may not claim the protections of the business judgment rule if they have
failed to reasonably inform themselves before reaching their decision.
Admittedly, both of these decisions involved a board's evaluation of an

acquisition offer for the entire company, a context that may be sui
generis, but the logic of the analysis potentially applies across the entire
universe of managerial decisionmaking. 74 To be sure, the level of deliberation that is reasonable varies with the matter at issue, and the financial
amounts involved in a corporate acquisition serve to warrant, from a

simple cost-benefit perspective, more exhaustive board consideration.
But from the same cost-benefit perspective, enhanced board or manage-

rial involvement may also be called for as the decision at issue seems less
and less plausible on its face, so that the anticipated benefits from addi-

tional scrutiny appear more substantial. Accordingly, in the type of case
posed by the second illustration, a court may be expected to ask exactly
how the insurance company's board came to conclude that the long-term

benefits from making 40% of its loans to inner-city projects warranted
the increased risks and what information it obtained and used in reaching
this conclusion. Certainly, however-as the commentary to the A.L.I.
Principles suggests 71-this kind of informational backup will not be re-

quired in most cases of enlightened self-interest, just as it is not routinely

required for more conventional operating expenditures. 76 But judicial review of the quality of the decisionmaking process remains potentially
available as the most realistic solution, consistent with the business judg-

ment rule, to those extreme cases where the existence of for-profit motivation seems highly suspect but direct proof of an illicit motive is not
72 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (en bane).
73 Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
74 The notion that the availability of the business judgment rule presupposes that the directors
have discharged their duty of care to inform themselves adequately is not new to the case law.
Various earlier opinions had contained discussions to that effect. See, eg., Treadway Cos. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980); Evans v. Armour & Co., 241 F. Supp. 705, 713 (E.D. Pa.
1965); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643
(Sup. Ct. 1944). See generally A.L.I. PRINCIPLEs-TD#4, supra note 51, § 4.01(c)(2) comment e,
at 64-66, and reporter's note 3, at 75. In none of these cases was this precondition applied to negate
the rule's protection, however, as it was in the Van Gorkom and Hanson Trust cases.
75 See A.L.I. PRINCIPLEs-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment f, at 29: "Although the
corporate decisionmaker ... needs to meet a standard of care in making his decisions, that standard
can be satisfied even when, as is often the case, a prospective profit cannot be particularized."
76 That courts are not-or at least have not traditionally been-inclined to inquire into the
quality of the board's decisionmaking process just because the facts smack of nonprofit motivation is
vividly illustrated by Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968). In holding
that the directors' failure to install lights at Wrigley Field was protected by the business judgment
rule, the court did not discuss what factors, if any, the directors relied upon in adhering to that
policy. The language in the opinion suggesting that this policy was not necessarily inconsistent with
a for-profit motivation, see supra text accompanying note 40, seems to indicate that the court itself
was supplying plausible rationales the directors may have had, rather than evaluating rationales
actually advanced by the defendants. See 95 Ill. App. 2d at 180-81, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
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available.

3.2

7

MARKET

DISCIPLINE

AS A CHECK ON MANAGERIAL

DISCRETION

One possible response to the concerns raised in the preceding subsection-and it is a response that applies as well to the other topics discussed in this paper, but will be taken up here for convenience-is that
notwithstanding the dilution of enforceable legal standards, market
forces will operate to restrain executives from deviating too far from the
path of profit maximization. This is a principal point that Professor
Brickley makes in his paper. 71 In particular, he lists the market for corporate control, the market for managerial labor, intracorporate monitoring mechanisms and incentive-based management compensation
contracts as available control devices. In the cases of the market for corporate control and management compensation arrangements, he cites
several empirical studies as support for his conclusions.
It is difficult to quarrel with Professor Brickley's argument that each
of these devices poses some potential for holding managerial discretion in
check. The key question, though, is at what point do these devices come
into play? The discussion that follows examines this question with respect to the market for corporate control and managerial compensation
arrangements, and concludes that, given the level of flexibility conceded
by these devices, the issue of legal standards to control managerial discretion retains its importance.
Let us consider first the market for corporate control, together with
the product market in which the firm operates. In theory, if the firm's
product market was characterized by perfect competition-and assuming
no "economic rents," that is, special competitive advantages (such as a
patent) possessed by the firm but not by its competitors-expending firm
resources on social responsibility over the long run would drive the firm
out of business. The firm could not increase its prices to recover these
extra costs not shared by its competitors, and the resulting reduction in
the firm's return on investment would foreclose its ability to raise new
capital.7 9
77 One important implication, however, of using the objective rationality requirement to get at

what are, in reality, cases of improper motive is that the plaintiff's theory of recovery is shifted from
bad faith and duty of loyalty to negligence and duty of care. Thus, the directors may be protected

from personal liability for their decision in those jurisdictions that have recently enacted statutes
limiting, or permitting the shareholders to limit, the liability of directors for ordinary or gross negligence. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1974 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-135-1(e) (Bums Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Anderson Supp. 1987); Act of Nov.
28, 1986, Act No. 1986-145 § 1 (42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8364).
78 Brickley, Managerial Goals and the Court System: Some Economic Insights, 13 CAN-U.S.

L.J. 77, 78-83 (1988).
79 See generally H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, supra note 16, at 12-14 (Manne lecture); R. PosNER, supra note 25, at 394-95.
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But the kinds of markets in which our large, publicly-held corporations do business do not typically exhibit free competition. David Engel
has argued that, as the firm's product market becomes less and less competitive, the costs of the firm's social responsibility will be increasingly

shifted from its shareholders to its customers, at least so long as the level
of social responsibility is directly related to the level of the firm's operations.8 0 This has implications for the market for corporate control. No

doubt at some point the amount of social responsibility expenditures becomes so great that outsiders could take over the firm, put it on a strictly
for-profit basis, and reap a net gain for their efforts from the resulting
increase in firm value. But given the expenses and the risk of takeover,
and the fact that the acquirer does not receive the entire firm-wide gainonly that portion attributable to the share of the equity it purchases-the
level of pre-takeover altruism must be quite substantial to make the gambit worthwhile. As a result, management typically enjoys discretionary
control over a significant portion of corporate cash flow, which it is free
to "waste" without creating a serious risk of takeover." And if the firm's
market power allows it to pass on much of the costs of social responsibility to its customers or others, this freedom becomes all the greater.8 2
Further, as Henry Manne and others have pointed out, by attributing
some of his or her conduct to corporate altruism, the executive may attack the propriety of being judged solely on the basis of profits, and
thereby subvert
any performance evaluation confined to objective
83
standards.

With respect to incentive compensation for management-and to a
lesser extent this point applies to all of the control devices discussed by
Professor Brickley-all that these arrangements can do is impose upon
80 Engel, supra note 16, at 25-26. Professor Mashaw has elaborated upon this point to illustrate how the allocation of the costs of social responsibility among the corporation's shareholders,
customers and laborers will depend upon the corporation's relative market power in each of those
markets and the nature of the expenditure. See Mashaw, supra note 25, at 118-23. The assumption
implicitly made throughout most of this paper, though, is that the costs of social responsibility fall
upon the shareholders. This should be a harmless simplification. The fiduciary problems posed by
management's diverting funds from shareholder wealth to other causes will not ordinarily be affected
by whether the shareholders bear 100 cents on the dollar or only 75 cents, with consumers contributing the remaining 25. Where the prospect for such cost reallocation affects the logic of the analysis,
however, it will be noted.
81 See, e.g., H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, supra note 16, at 15-20, 27-28 (Manne lecture).
82 See Engel, supra note 16, at 25-26. But this is not to say that social responsibility activities
are without cost to management. Under the theoretical view set forth in the text, the "cost" is that
the portion of its purely discretionary funds management applies to social responsibility will not be
available to provide other pro-management benefits such as excess compensation or perquisites. See
H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, supra note 16, at 20-27 (Manne lecture).
83 Manne, supra note 26, at 415. See also Clark, supranote 28, at 198-99, 208; Hetherington,
Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Manager, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN L.
REv. 248, 279-81 (1969). Control Data Corp. under founder and long-time CEO William C. Norris
may be viewed by many as an example of a management that sought to rationalize its poor financial
performance in part by pointing to its social responsibility. See, eg., Walters, Norris Pleased by
Legacy, L.A. Times, Mar. 10, 1986, sec. IV, at 1, col. 2.
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management personally some of the loss associated with any reduction in
corporate profits. If management were otherwise indifferent to social responsibility this might suffice to align management's self-interest with
that of the profit-seeking shareholders. But as we saw in subsection
3.1.3.1 above, management's motivation is more complicated than that.
So long as the psychic gratification it receives from the social responsibility activity remains greater that its pro rata share of the costs84 -and in
the large, publicly-held corporation that share will likely be quite smallsuch arrangements will not alter management's behavior but simply reduce its net gain.
The limitation on Professor Brickley's theory, therefore, is that the
linkage between market forces and managerial discretion is likely to be
attenuated, both by competitive slack and the existence of competing
managerial benefits. Professor Oliver Williamson has discussed, however, how the transformation of the modem corporation's organizational
structure from a unitary (or U-form) to a multidivisional (or M-form)
character may work to improve this linkage.85 Under Williamson's view,
the general office of the M-form corporation operates as a small-scale
capital market in allocating resources among the divisions. The implication for our purposes is that because the executives responsible for strategic planning are removed from functional and operating responsibilities,
their psychic gratification from operating policies that seek to benefit employee, customer or local community interests at the expense of shareholder gain is much diluted, and they should therefore be inclined to
monitor divisional performance and budgets with a less distracted eye to
profit.
There are some recent developments suggesting that market discipline may be exerting a greater check on management than it has in the
past. Among them are the prospect of enhanced foreign competition and
the rise in hostile takeover activity. The takeover has a two-fold effect,
First, pre-takeover, as noted above, pressures management of prospective
target firms to keep profits up. Second, post-takeover, the target becomes
a subsidiary of the takeover firm whose management lacks the loyalties
to the target's employees and other constituencies that the target's management had previously held. One result may be a fall-off in corporate
philanthropy along with other kinds of social volunteerism.86 For example, a recent study suggests that corporate charitable contributions for
84 And keep in mind that the relevant costs here are not the total costs of the social responsibility activity in question, only that portion born by the corporation's shareholders rather than its
customers and others. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
85 See Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1222-26 (1984). Professor Williamson's views are set forth in more detail in 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS ch. 8 (1975).
86 See, ag., Deutsch, TheAx Falls on Equal Opportunity, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1987, at Fl, col.
2 (describing how increased foreign competition and mergers have caused corporations to cut costs
by reducing staff; and the negative effect on affirmative action programs).
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1986 will be about 2.5% below those for 1985, which would represent the
first decline in sixteen years.8 7
3.3

DISCRETION TO CONSIDER, EXPRESSLY, OBJECTIVES OTHER
THAN SHAREHOLDER GAIN

As we saw in subsection 3.1.3.1, by virtue of the subjective belief
requirement, a decision that may be rational on purely business grounds
is nonetheless subject to invalidation if management candidly admits that
its motives were other than profit-based. In this sense, management's
discretion is considerably narrowed when it chooses to act in the name of
nonshareholder objectives. This was the thrust of the vegetarian restaurant illustration.88 This subsection considers the opposite side of that
issue. To what extent may a corporate decision, questionable as a purely
business proposition, be nonetheless justified on the basis of other considerations? In other words, may the pursuit of nonshareholder objectives
actually add to the scope of management's discretion on questions of operating policy?
The case law on management's authority to consider interests other
than shareholder gain in the formulation of operating policy is virtually
nonexistent. Nonetheless, the A.L.I. Principlesof Corporate Governance
has attempted to speculate, on the basis of the authorities that do exist,
about management's discretion in this area, and we will use its conclusions as a basis for considering the relevant issues. Under section 2.01 of
the Principles,management has the discretion to depart from the general
objective of maximizing shareholder value in two instances: (i) It may
devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian,
educational and philanthropic purposes8 9 and (ii) it may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate
to the responsible conduct of business.' The first two subsections, below, will take these topics up in turn, and will focus upon the views of the
A.L.I. reporters. The third subsection then examines the statutes recently enacted by several states, which expressly authorize directors to
consider the interests of corporate constituencies other than the shareholders, and evaluates their potential effect on traditional doctrine.
87 Teltsch, DropSeen in Business Donations,N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1986, at 27, col. 1. Among
the reasons given for the projected decrease were declines in profits, especially among the large oil
companies, and the increase in corporate mergers, acquisitions, and restructurings.
88 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
89 A.L.I. PRINCIPLEs-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01(c).
90 Id. § 2.01(b).
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3.3.1

LAW

Public Welfare, Humanitarian,Educationaland Philanthropic
Purposes

Both the comments91 and the illustrations92 contained in the Principles make clear that the provision for devoting reasonable resources to
public welfare, humanitarian, educational and philanthropic purposes is
not confined to money donations to third parties but includes operating
decisions as well.93 The reporters' direct authority for these conclusions
is, however, quite thin. Their discussion centers on the statutory and
case law involving charitable and similar donations to third parties,94 but
various commentators have questioned whether those authorities should
thus be96extended, either as a matter of statutory construction 95 or sound
policy.
From the policy standpoint, the critical issue is whether the
problems of managerial accountability and risk to the shareholders are
aggravated by moving beyond conventional third-party donations, and
the ready answer would seem to be that they are. Charitable and philanthropic donations necessarily are easily identifiable as such and typically
involve a defined dollar commitment, so that both the objects and the
scope of management's generosity are clearly displayed. As a result,
shareholders can more readily monitor management's conduct and put
mechanisms in place to regulate it, as by limiting charitable contributions
to a fixed percentage of net income. With socially motivated operating
decisions, on the other hand, both the goals and the costs become
blended into the corporation's regular, for-profit activities. In a similar
vein, Dean Robert Mundheim, writing with particular reference to public-welfare-oriented investments by life insurance companies, has noted
that such investments, unlike traditional donations, have a potentially
open-ended quality. 97 The company therefore encounters difficulty in es91 "The term 'resources,' as used in § 2.01(c), refers not only to money contributions, but also
to the provision of skills, manpower, physical facilities, and the like." Id. § 2.01 comment i, at 41.

92 See id. § 2.01 comment i, illustration 21, at 45, discussed infra at text accompanying notes

153-54; see also id. comment i, illustration 22, at 45-46, discussed infra at text accompanying notes
107-08.

93 See id. § 2.01, comment i; see also 61 A.L.I. PROC. 454-55 (1984) (comments by Professor
Melvin A. Eisenberg, reporter for A.L.I. PRINCIPLEs-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01, stating that
keeping a plant in Bedford Stuyvesant, rather than moving it to the South and thereby increasing
profits, might be deemed appropriate under § 2.01(c) as a humanitarian purpose); Schwartz, supra
note 11, at 517-18, 530-32 (discussing the Bedford-Stuyvesent example).
94 See A.L.I. PRINCIPLEs-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 reporter's notes 2, 4, at 48-49, 50-51.
These authorities are discussed in detail infra in subsection 4.1.
95 See Blumberg, supra note 13, at 174, 195-97; see also Engel, supra note 16, at 15.
96 See Mundheim, supra note 18, at 1254.
97 Professor Donald Schwartz has voiced related concerns. Discussing the example ofmanagement's decision to retain an uncompetitive plant in a depressed urban area, he has observed that
management's decision to bear increased marginal costs, with no prospect of offsetting economic
gain, may well be unreasonable under the A.L.I. Pr'nciples. In contrast, a program with confined
expenditures and some prospect of gain, such as employing and training minority workers would be
permissible in his view. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 517-18, 530-32.
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timating its potential loss exposure when deciding to make the commitment, and, once the commitment has been made, may face considerable
pressure to invest additional funds to save the project if it flounders.98
Good arguments can be made from the other side of the fence,
though. Shareholders are free to make charitable contributions for themselves. Operating policy and its consequences are, on the other hand,
unique to the corporation.9 9 In addition, market discipline may supply a
stronger check on managerial discretion in the case of operating policy.
The costs of the corporation's social welfare commitments-such as hiring the hard core unemployed, continuing to do business in depressed
inner city areas, or utilizing pollution control equipment beyond the legal
minimum-will be spread over time and will likely vary directly with
its
level of production. Thus, unlike the sunk costs of a one-shot charitable
contribution, such expenses will become embedded in the firm's marginal
cost structure and thereby stand to influence its production and pricing
decisions over time.10 0 As a result, management will typically be required to reexamine these costs on an ongoing basis and will face recurring pressures (market and other) to hold them within tolerable
bounds.101

On reflection, therefore, the policy arguments do not appear to point
98 See Mundheim, supra note 18, at 1254. Dean Mundheim notes two additional differences
between public-welfare investments and traditional donations. First, such investments often require
substantial administrative time. Second, traditional donations are typically confined to organizations
that satisfy the requirements for exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which thereby provides some external screening, with criteria enacted through the political process,
of the eligible beneficiaries of the corporation's benevolence. Id This last point is not as forceful as
the others, however. Given the breadth of the section 501(c)(3) categories-they include organizations "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international sports competition... or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals," I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982)-the resulting screen is
necessarily of wide mesh. These criteria provide no real assurance that the recipients of the corporation's charity will be limited to organizations with broad-based public or shareholder support.
99 See Mashaw, supra note 25, at 121-22.
100 One consequence may be that a portion of the expenses will be passed on to the corporation's customers, laborers or suppliers, to the extent the corporation enjoys market power in any of
those markets. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
101 True, the very altruism that led the corporation to make the social welfare commitments in
the first place could also cause managers to (in effect) subsidize the resulting costs by excising them
from their decisionmaking and, as a result, undertaking kinds or levels of production that would be
inefficient from a strictly financial point of view. But it is not inconsistent to expect management
sometimes to engage in rational profit-maximizing behavior even when the matter at issue involves
the corporation's earlier social welfare commitments. Most basically, the production decision presently under consideration may be within the purview of a middle manager, who is compensated in
part on the basis of financial performance, while the social welfare commitment had been made at
the board level. In addition, since the decisions are made at different times, there is no assurance
that the corporation's dedication to the social goal will remain constant. Thus, for example, the fact
that the corporation had earlier decided to retain its plant in an inner city location does not mean
that a manager will subsequently choose to overlook its higher costs when deciding whether to
produce a newly designed part there or at a more efficient plant the corporation has recently constructed in the south.
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clearly in one way or the other. And one needs to be careful about taking
too literal a view of the wording of the state charitable contributions statutes. As we shall see in subsection 4.1. below, these statutes were enacted with the view to confirming the legality of what had become
widespread corporate practice, 10 2 and courts have not tended to read
them narrowly.10 3 It is plausible that their terms were typically limited
to "donations" because such gifts, by their very nature, appear to conflict
with the traditional goal of profit maximization in a way that more everyday operating policies, such as keeping a plant open or hiring a minority
contractor, do not. Thus, the speculations by the A.L.I. reporters on
these points seem sound." ° Necessarily, there are limits to managerial
discretion in these matters-even once the statutory concerns are removed-and we will consider them in connection with the discussion of
the recent statutes in subsection 3.3.3 below.
In any event, one area where the courts are likely to be particularly
tolerant is conduct in support of a clearly defined governmental policy or
program. What distinguishes these cases is that a judgment has been
made by a decisionmaker accountable to the political process that the
societal benefits of the policy or program warrant the cost of the corporation's contribution. Thus, concerns over the accountability of corporate
management are reduced, as managerial discretion is limited to deciding
whether to adopt the trade-off already made and endorsed by the governmental decisionmaker rather than fashioning the trade-off on its own initiative.1 0 5 As a result, such conduct, even though expressly premised on
nonshareholder considerations, is likely to be protected, for all intents
and purposes, by the business judgment rule.106
The A.L.I. reporters appear to endorse this view in an illustration
involving a computer manufacturer's proposed sales to a North African
country. 107 As negotiations were being completed, the U.S. State Department announced that further shipments of high-technology equipment to the country would be prohibited. While the ban would not
become effective until after the proposed sale, the State Department
102 See, eg., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 160, 98 A.2d 581, 590, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953) (characterizing the New Jersey statute as confirmatory of the corporation's existing power). See also infra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
103 See infra notes 23546 and accompanying text.
104 See Wetzel & Winokur, supra note 61, at 241 (also reaching this conclusion). The reporters' position is also corroborated, in an indirect way, by the commentary on the recent statutes
expressly permitting management to consider nonshareholder interests. As we shall see, these statutes have generally been characterized as simply confirming, not changing, the law. See infra notes
127-28 and accompanying text.
105 The fact that the same trade-off will be applied throughout the affected industry works to
assure each individual firm that it will not suffer a competitive disadvantage due to its voluntarism.
See Arrow, supra note 61, at 309-10 (discussing the advantages of institutionalizing social
responsibility).
106 This point will be refined somewhat in subsection 3.3.3. See infra note 144.
107 A.L.I. PRINCIPLEs-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment i, illustration 22, at 4546.
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urged voluntary compliance for pre-effective transactions. Although the
corporation's projected earnings from the sale are $6 million-its total

annual earnings are $60-$70 million-its management concludes not to
sign the contract in view of the strong national policy. The reporters
conclude that the decision is reasonable under the circumstances,

although the amount of foregone income-10% of annual earnings-is
high, and (by implication) a comparable sacrifice in the interests of other
social goals might not be reasonable.108
Here, there is some authority to support the reporters' view. For
example, in Sylvia Martin Foundation, Inc. v. Swearingen,10 9 a shareholder challenged Standard Oil Co. of Indiana's 1965 decision to float a
bond issue outside the U.S. in deference to the Johnson Administration's
voluntary program for improving the U.S. balance-of-payments. 1 10 The
plaintiff alleged that management wasted corporate assets by causing the
corporation to pay rates of interest higher than those prevailing in the
U.S. markets. The court responded, in dicta-it dismissed the suit on
jurisdictional grounds-that were it to reach the merits, it would find the
complaint insufficient as a matter of law, in that it challenged the direc-

tors' business judgment and policy, which is not open to review "absent

an allegation of fraud, personal profit or gain." ' Broad support for the
corporation's compliance with governmental policy is also provided by
the Model Business Corporation Act, which empowers the corporation
108 Id. at 46. To be sure, "voluntary" compliance with a governmental program may often be
a strictly business decision, motivated by the long-term profit implications of incurring the government's disfavor. The 1962 confrontation between President Kennedy and U.S. Steel chairman Roger
M. Blough over the steel industry's failure to honor the Administration's request to forego a price
increase provides a well known example. U.S. Steel rescinded the price increase within a few days, in
response to a variety of governmental pressures, including the threats of antitrust investigation and
of being bypassed on government contracts and public opinion. See Ruder, supranote 66, at 219-21.
The commentary to the Principlesof CorporateGovernance indicates that activity in furtherance
of governmental policy need not be limited to compliance with a specific program. It may include
"activity that, although technically not required by statute, is designed to further the policy underlying a statute, such as activity designed to further policies concerning preservation of the environment
or avoidance of discrimination in employment." A.L.I. PRINCPLES-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01
comment i, at 40. However, when the details of the activity become more a matter of management's
own initiation and less a response to a clearly articulated governmental policy, concerns for managerial discretion are greater, and as a result the reasonableness of the resource commitment becomes
more of an issue. In contrast to the illustration discussed in the text, for example, would it be
reasonable for the corporation to spend 10% of its earnings on pollution control, over and above
what it spends on legally mandated measures, simply because environmental protection is the subject
of statutory regulation?
109 Sylvia Martin Foundation v. Swearingen, 260 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
110 The court's opinion does not expressly attribute the company's decision to the existence of
the voluntary program, but the connection is clear from contemporaneous accounts of the case. The
company's vice president and general counsel acknowledged that the decision was "in part in respouse" to the program, and lawyers for the Commerce Department were concerned about the case's
impact on the program. See Holders Unit Sues to Bar Indiana Standard Borrowing Overseas at
"Excessive" Rates, Wall St. J., Feb. 8,1966, at 4, col. 3; see also An Unwelcome Complication, Wall
St. J., Feb. 21, 1966, at 14, col. 1 (editorial describing the case and criticizing the Johnson program).
111 Sylvia Martin Foundation v. Swearingen, 260 F. Supp. at 235.
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governmental
"to transact any lawful business that will aid
1 13
and similar statutes enacted by a few states.

policy,

1 12

3.3.2 Ethical Considerations
The A.L.I. Principles of Corporate Governance also breaks new
ground by explicitly recognizing that the board and management may
take into account "ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business." 1' 14 Here, the reporters candidly admit that there is very little direct authority to support
their position. 15 They argue, however, that it would be anomalous to
permit corporations to make charitable donations but to prohibit them
from acting ethically and that they believe the provision to be supported
by modem corporate practice.' 16
Few would contend that individuals are (or should be) foreclosed
from acting ethically simply because they are acting in the capacity of
corporate officers or directors. Not only would the everyday act of dealing with corporations be rendered tedious for all of us, but corporations
officers and
would likely have substantial difficulty recruiting directors,
17
other managers willing to serve under such a regimen.
What is novel about the A.L.I. position is the apparent breadth of
what it places under the heading of acceptable ethical considerations.
The express requirement is that the ethical consideration at issue be "reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business." 118 The illustrations reveal that this is not limited to such
112 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 3.02(14) (1984).

113 See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(12) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.011(2)(1) (West
1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 3.10(m) (Smith-Hurd 1985); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. art.
2.02A(15) (Vernon Supp. 1986). See also E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW 38 (1972) (presuming that a board of directors' determination under the Delaware statute
would be protected by the business judgment rule).
The statutes of several other states, however, grant the corporation express power to aid the
government only in time of war or national emergency. See, eg., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.1251(2) (West 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-1(n) (West Supp. 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW §§ 201(c), 202(a)(12) (McKinney 1986); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(C) (Anderson
1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1314 (Purdon 1967). The Model Business Corporation Act contained similarly limited language prior to its 1969 revision. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP.ACT § 4(n)
(1960) (amended 1969). The commentary accompanying the 1969 amendment demonstrates that a
substantial broadening of scope was intended. It notes as one of the reasons for the amendment "the
emergence of other equally important areas of government support in the elimination of poverty,
disease and civil strife." 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP.AT ANN. § 4(n) commentary at 183 (2d ed.
1971).
114 A.L.I. PRINCIPLEs-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01(b).
115 See id. § 2.01 reporter's note 5, at 51. See also 59 A.L.I. PRoc. 431 (1982) (comments of
Professor Harvey Goldschmid, Deputy Chief Reporter).
9
116 A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2, supra note , § 2.01 reporter's note 5, at 51.
117 See, e-g., Andrews, supra note 26, at 140-41 (contemporary corporate executives more
likely to be kinds of persons concerned with social problems).
118 A.L.I. PRINCIPLEs-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01(b). The comments elaborate that a useful
indicator of the propriety of taking into account a particular ethical consideration is whether doing
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traditional matters as good faith and candor. Among the permissible exercises of ethics are the performance of a disadvantageous contract, even
though a Statute of Frauds defense is available, 119 the purchase of an
annuity for a long-term employee who is forced to retire because of injuries sustained in an automobile accident,' 20 and the continued operation
of an unprofitable plant for three months to cushion the transition of
long-time employees who are about to be discharged.'
What makes this expansive view of ethical conduct important is the
fact that the sacrifice of profits in furtherance of ethical considerations
(unlike public welfare or charitable purposes) is not subject to the express
requirement of reasonableness.12 2 This makes good sense if the issue is
confined to the narrow, more traditional, notion of ethics. The ethical
prohibitions against a business's deliberately overbilling its clients are not
mitigated by the likelihood that such a practice will succeed and generate
substantial additional profits. Accordingly, the performance obligations
of the business's hired managers do not require them to undertake the
practice, no matter how much profit is thereby sacrificed.
What about broader social issues, however? Consider, for example,
the current controversy surrounding business investments in South Africa. If the test for acceptable ethics is whether the consideration at issue
"reflects a principle that is widely recognized by a significant portion of
the community,"'' 2 3 disinvestment-ceasing to do business in South Africa in the interests of refusing to cooperate with apartheid-should qualify. 12 4 After all, apartheid is directly at odds with principles at the heart
of our constitution. But should courts therefore uphold disinvestment, at
all costs, against a charge of waste? Suppose that most of the wealth of
family X consists of a minority interest in a U.S. corporation whose principal and longstanding business is the sale of mining equipment in South
Africa. Y, who is independently wealthy, inherits a controlling interest
in the corporation and, because of his personal abhorrence of apartheid,
so would violate the fair expectations of the shareholders as a group, which in turn will depend upon
whether the consideration reflects a principle that is widely recognized by a significant portion of the
community. Id. § 2.01 comment h, at 37.
119 Id. comment h, illustration 11, at 38.
120 Id. comment i, illustration 14, at 42.
121 Id. illustration 21, at 45.
122 Compare A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2, supra note 9 § 2.01(b) with id. § 2.01(c); see id. comment i, at 39-40. But see Comment, CorporateEthics and Corporate Governance:A Critique of the
ALI Statement on Corporate Governance Section 201(b), 71 CALIF. L. REv. 994, 1000 n.50 (1983)
(concluding that section 2.01(b) may impose an implicit reasonableness requirement).
123 A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment h, at 37.
124 Cf,eg., Dobris, Arguments in FavorofFiduciaryDivestment of "South African" Securities,
65 NEB. L. REv.209, 222-24 (1986); Schwartz, supra note 11, at 515-16, 532. The conclusion in the
text would appear particularly to be true in light of the reporters' observation that "principles may
emerge over time, and a corporate official should therefore be permitted to take into account emerging ethical principles, reasonably regarded as relevant to the conduct of business, that have significant support although less-than-universal acceptance." A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2, supra note 9,

§ 2.01 comment h, at 37.
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causes the corporation to liquidate its South African operations for 30
cents on the dollar. 125
Suppose family X brings suit to enjoin the sale on the grounds of
waste. To recognize the quite real possibility that a court would grant
the injunction is not to say that the law requires unethical conduct or to
demean the legitimacy of disinvestment as an ethical act. But conduct by
a fiduciary in the name of ethics-just like conduct in the name of philanthropy, compliance with governmental policy or, for that matter,
making profits-must be subject to an overriding requirement of reasonableness.1 26 The nature of the social concern cannot control to the total
exclusion of the financial consequences to shareholders, the alternatives
available and other underlying circumstances. Presumably, as the economic impact of the ethical consideration becomes more adverse to the
shareholders, the more traditional and widely held the consideration
must be in order to justify it. The beauty of the fiduciary principle is that
it provides the vehicle for weighing all of these considerations on a caseby-case basis. Inevitably, the A.L.I. reporters face an uphill battle when
they seek to reduce the totality of these factors to a few black letter principles. Their attempt to bring greater certainty and guidance to these
issues is praiseworthy, but some legal judgments may be, by their very
nature, beyond ready codification.
3.3.3

The Effect of Recent Statutes

Beginning with Pennsylvania in 1983, several states-principally in
the industrial North-have enacted statutes that expressly permit the
corporation's officers and directors to consider the interests of constituencies other than the shareholders, such as employees, customers and the
community, in making decisions that may affect them.127 The circumstances surrounding the enactment of at least some of these statutes reveal that a principal motive for their adoption was to clarify the scope1of
28
management's discretion in responding to a hostile acquisition offer.
125 The hypothetical assumes that the sale results solely from Y's personal moral beliefs, and
not from economic considerations that may be related to the apartheid issue, such as concerns for
the stability of the South African business climate or threats of boycott by the corporation's suppliers
or others.
126 See, eg., MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT § 8.30(a)(2), (3) (1984) (requirements that director
act with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances and in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation); A.L.I.
PRINCIPLEs-TDT#4, supra note 51, § 4.01(a) (similar).
127 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35l(d) (Burns Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1)(4)) (Vernon Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1987); Act of Nov. 28, 1986, Act No. 1986-145 § 1, 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 8363(b); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408(B) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
128 This is clearest in the case of the Illinois, Missouri and Pennsylvania statutes. The Missouri
statute, by its terms, applies only to acquisition proposals. The Illinois and the initial Pennsylvania
statutes were both enacted as a part of a package of legislation relating to takeovers. See Act of Aug.
23, 1985, Pub. Act. No. 84-204, 1985 Ill. Laws 1858; Act of Dec. 23, 1983, Act No. 1983-92, 1983
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Nonetheless, with the exception of Missouri, the wording of these statutes extends across the scope of the directors' or the directors' and officers' obligations. This subsection will consider, therefore, what impact
these provisions are likely to have on the general principles of managerial
discretion to consider nonshareholder interests, as discussed in the two
preceding subsections.
The critical difficulty in assessing these statutes is their silence as to
the weights to be given the various nonshareholder interests in balancing
them against shareholder gain. How should courts respond to the resulting indeterminacy? It seems clear, upon reflection, that the traditional
business judgment rule would prove unworkable as the standard governing decisions under the statutes. As we have seen, that rule simply
requires that the director or officer "rationally believe[ ]"that his or her
business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. 2 9 When the
shareholders are both giving up the quid and getting the quo, a uniform
dimension for comparison exists. The issue comes down to the relative
dollar values of both sides, and an objective standard of rationality provides meaningful limitations. If, however, the shareholders are giving up
the "quid" but someone else is getting the "quo," inter-group welfare
comparisons are required, and the subjective preferences of the decisionmaker become critical. Is $1 million in additional profits worth sacrificing one thousand jobs? One hundred jobs? Ten jobs? For such
decisions, objective rationality means merely that some rational person
somewhere-be it Ralph Nader or Milton Friedman-would believe the
trade-off to be in the best interests of the various statutory constituencies,
taken as a collective whole.
The inherent slipperiness in such a standard conjures up Professor
Berle's concerns about the demise of managerial accountability.130 The
potential reordering of traditional shareholder property rights implicit in
such a diluted standard of review should require, at the very minimum, a
clear legislative acknowledgment that this was what was intended. The
very limited legislative history available suggests, however, that the recent statutes were seen as little more than codifications of the alreadyPa. Laws 395. The Ohio provision, on the other hand, was enacted separately, see Act of Jan. 3,
1985, 1983-84 Ohio Laws 4169; Act of Jul. 11, 1984, 1983-84 Ohio Laws 2751, but was most recently amended as part of a legislative package containing antitakeover measures, see Act of Nov. 22,
1986, 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-688 (Baldwin). And the Indiana provision was enacted as a part of a
complete revision of the state's corporate law, see Act of Mar. 5, 1986, Pub. Law No. 149-1986, 1986
Ind. Acts 1377. In view of the fact that Ohio had already enacted, and Indiana contemporaneously
enacted, strong antitakeover laws, see IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -24, 23-3-9-1 to -22 (Burns
Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.83.1 (Anderson 1985), it seems likely that the statutes'
implications for takeover defenses were not lost upon their drafters. Moreover, virtually all of the
recent focus on the "impact on nonshareholder constituencies" issue-in the case law, in corporate
charter amendments and in the commentary-has been in the takeover context.
129 A.L.I. PRINcIPLES-TD#4, supra note 51, § 4.01(c)(3) & comment f.

130 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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held view.131 And commentary by lawyers within the respective states
reinforces this conclusion. 132
But the existence of some managerial discretion to balance other
interests against shareholder value, as confirmed by these recent statutes,
cannot be dismissed. It is, after all, entirely consistent with the managerialist view of executive behavior as posited by various scholars13 3 and
reflects the way big-business leadership has often characterized its mission in statements for public consumption. 134 Consider, for example, the
Statement on CorporateResponsibility published by the Business Roundtable in October 1981.135 Its premises are that "[c]orporations operate
within a web of complex, often competing relationships" and that
"[c]arefully weighing the impacts of decisions and balancing different
constituent interests-in the context of both near-term and long-term effects-must be an integral part of the corporation's decision-making and
managerial process. ' 131 The Statement identifies the corporation's key

constituencies as customers, employees, communities, society at large,

suppliers and shareholders, and illustrates how the interests of these con-

stituencies may diverge with the "classic example" of management's decision whether to establish, expand or close a plant:
Balancing the shareholder's expectations of maximum return against

131 See, eg., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 note on 1984 committee report, at 78 (Anderson 1985) (stating committee's belief that current law permits directors to consider other interests,
but statute clarifies and specifies breadth of that discretion); 1983 PA. LEGIS. J.-SENATE 1434 (Dec.
6, 1983) (bill analysis submitted by Senator Fisher describing statute as eliminating any doubt on
propriety of considering other interests); telephone interview with William K. Weisenberg, Director
of Government Affairs, Ohio State Bar Association (Feb. 5, 1985) (Ohio statute was proposed to
confirm position many corporate lawyers assumed to be the case even in the absence of statute).
132 See McKenna & Bitner, The "FairPrice" Amendment to the Illinois Business Corporation
Act, 67 CHI.B. REc. 64, 69 (1986) (referring to the Illinois statute as "the codification of a 'liberalized business judgment rule' "); Sell, Annual Survey of SignificantDevelopments in the Law - Corporations, 55 PA. B.A.Q. 120, 125 (1986) (describing the Pennsylvania statute as "basically a
restatement of existing law and practice").
133 For descriptions of the manageialism concept, see, e.g., McKie, Changing Views, in SoCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT 17, 30 (J.McKie ed. 1974); F. SUTroN,
S. HARRIS, C. KAYSON & J.TOBIN, THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CREED 58 (1956).
134 The literature on corporate social responsibility is replete with quotations from business
executives describing their role as balancing the interests of multiple constituencies of which the
shareholders are merely one. See, eg., M. HEALD, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS 97
(1970) (quoting from 1926 speech by Gerald Swope, president of General Electric Co.); B.
SHENFIELD, COMPANY BOARDS 12 (1971) ("balancing of interests" is most common explanation of
board decisionmaking); Dodd, supra note 29, 45 HARv. L. REv. at 1154-55 (quoting from 1929
speech by Owen D. Young, chairman of General Electric Co.); Mason, The Apologetics of"Managerlalsm," 31 J.Bus. 1, 3 (1958) (quoting chairman of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey); Mundheim,
supra note 18, at 1247-48 (quoting from 1971 speech by chief executive officer of Prudential Life
Insurance Co. of America). But see Levitt, supra note 35, at 42-44 (dismissing such statements as,
for the most part, fashionable public relations); see also Hetherington, supra note 83, at 277-78 (discussing the various purposes served by such statements).
135 THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 5 (1981).

136 Id. at 8.
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other priorities is one of the fundamental problems confronting corporate management. The shareholder must receive a good return but the
legitimate concerns of other constituencies also must have the appropriate attention.
Striving to reach the appropriate balance, some leading managers
have come to believe that the primary role of corporations is to help
meet society's legitimate needs for goods and services and to earn a
reasonable return for the shareholders in the process. They are aware
that this must be done in a socially acceptable manner. They believe
that by giving enlightened consideration to balancing the legitimate
claims of all its constituents,
a corporation will best serve the interest
137
of its shareholders.

Similar views had been advanced ten years earlier by another elite business group, the Committee for Economic Development.13 8

From the perspective of theory, therefore, a key issue is the extent to
which the enactment of the recent statutes-whether they are read as

making law or simply confirming it-signals the absorption of these
managerialist views into modern U.S. corporate law. More specifically,
contemporary corporate law has been confronted with two alternative
views of the shareholder's role. The traditional position, and still apparently the mainstream view, 139 has of course been that the shareholders

are the owners of the corporation and management's role is simply to run
it on their behalf. The alternative view sees the shareholder of the public

corporation not as an owner but as the holder of a set of contract-like
claims against the corporation. 4 ° Under this view, the shareholder dif137 Id. at 9. This passage led former SEC Commissioner Bevis Longstreth to note that the
Business Roundtable's view "comes rather close to the position of Ralph Nader and his colleagues
Mark Green and Joel Seligman, authors of Taming the Giant Corporation and promoters of the
Corporate Democracy Act of 1980." Address by Commissioner Longstreth, entitled "Defining the
Corporate Objective and Implications for Philanthropy," delivered to the Financial Executives Institute, North Carolina Area Conference, Hilton Head, S.C., at 3 (May 22, 1982). Other statements by
the Business Roundtable have, however, reflected the more traditional view that shareholder interests are paramount. See Statement of the Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the
Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAw. 2083, 2099-101 (1978).
138 COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS

CORPORATIONS 19-23 (1971). Professor James W. McKie has described this statement as "almost
an official manifesto of the managerial view in its current phase of development." McKie, supra note
133, at 30 n.15.
139 See, eg., ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director'sGuidebook, 33 Bus.
LAW. 1591, 1606 (1978); Statement of the Business Roundtable, supra note 137, at 2099-101; A.L.I.
PRINCIPLEs-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment c (obligations of § 2.01 run to, and may be
varied by, the shareholders).
140 This focus upon the realities of the shareholder's position may be traced to the seminal
work of Professors Berle and Means. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY bk. II, ch. VIII (1932). Leading examples of this view in the more recent
legal literature include Hetherington, supra note 83, at 250-63; Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE
L.J. 1477, 1490-94 (1958). This view is also consistent with a recent body of financial economics
literature, which views the corporation as the nexus for a set of contracting relationships, with shareholders as merely one of the contracting parties, whose principal contribution is to bear residual risk.
See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, Separationof Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302-04 (1983);
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fers from other investors (such as bondholders) in the terms of his claims,
but not in the essence of his economic position. Clearly, it is this latter
view that seems closer to the direction of the recent statutes. Thus, the
task for proponents of the traditional position is to find the means to
reconcile the continuing conception of the shareholder as ultimate owner
with the reality of management's position-now endorsed by statutethat it should nonetheless be free to balance shareholder gain against
competing third-party interests.
In speculating on how this reconciliation might be effected, it is useful to conceive of any legal standard for reviewing managerial conduct as
consisting of two essential components. The first is a referent-a hypothetical decisionmaker against whom to test management's decisions.
The second is a confidence level-how certain must we be that our hypothetical decisionmaker would (or might) have responded as management
actually did, in order to uphold management's decision?
In selecting our hypothetical decisionmaker, the two most obvious
candidates are the director and the shareholder. 14 1 But neither is completely satisfactory. A test predicated on what a reasonably prudent director would have done under similar circumstances has the virtue of
coming closest to prevailing formulations of the director's obligation. 4
The problem with extending this orientation to the current issue of tradeoffs between shareholder value and the interests of other constituencies,
however, is that it selects a decisionmaker who lacks the disciplining perspective supplied by a property interest in what is being given away. This
is troublesome both as a matter of fiduciary law, in light of the prospect
for psychic rewards and intangible conflicts of interest discussed
above,1 4 3 and as a philosophical proposition, as it constitutes management as a kind of self-contained elite, with the mandate to develop its
own normative code as to just how altruistic investors ought to be with
their savings. In short, it belies the core premise from which this discussion emerged-that shareholders remain the ultimate owners of the
corporation.
The ready solution to these concerns is to focus on the average
shareholder-shareholders might, under certain circumstances, be willing to sacrifice some of their return in order to stave off significant hardJensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 310-11 (1976).
141 Other commentators have noted the law's failure to consider which of these two is the
appropriate referent in matters of social responsibility. See Brudney, supra note 28, at 641.
142 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 8.30(a)(2) (1984) requires the director to act "with the care
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise in similar circumstances." The Official Comment explains: "The phrase 'in a like position' recognizes that the 'care' under considera-

tion is that which would be used by the 'ordinarily prudent person' if he were a director of the
particular corporation." 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 929 (3d ed. 1985). See also A.L.I.
PRINCPLES-TD#4, supra note 51, § 4.01(a); CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1977); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1986).
143 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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ship to other corporate constituencies-and to view management simply
as the shareholders' agent in implementing their altruism.144 This experience is not necessarily relevant to our task, however. The conclusion
that the shareholder's management of his or her own affairs is not the
appropriate referent for measuring the level of attention the director
should devote to the business should not foreclose resort to the tastes and
preferences of the average shareholder as the appropriate referent in testing what comes down to a value choice among competing social interests.
But if the referent that emerges is the passive investor (whether the individual or the institution) in the publicly-held corporation, the reasonable
shareholder standard raises problems as well. Managing any business
over time will typically create, in the minds of the manager, some sense
of loyalty, responsibility and obligation to the persons and institutions
dependent on the business or responsible for its success, including customers, suppliers, employees and the community at large. These "soft
commitments" cannot be reduced to formal contract, but they are
honored nonetheless. A legal standard that focuses upon the trade-offs
that would be made by a shareholder with no personal involvement in
the business will likely result in these commitments being ignored. Just
as it seems inappropriate to subject the shareholders-because of their
status as passive investors-to the personal tastes, preferences and philosophies of the directors, it seems equally inappropriate to permit that
status to immunize the shareholders from the subtle commitments that
typically accompany running a business.
The solution may be to look to the individual proprietor as the appropriate referent. This has the virtue of accommodating the manager's
sense of accrued commitments to various interests in the business, but at
the same time requiring that the commitment be of sufficient importance
to the hypothetical decisionmaker that he or she would be willing to
honor it from his or her own pocket. Looking to the decisions a reasonable proprietor would make thus provides a simple, but quite useful, perspective for preserving managerial accountability in the face of the openended recent statutes and for reconciling
those statutes with the concep145
tion of the shareholder as owner.
Irrespective of whose tastes and preferences are selected as the appli'44 Adoption of a reasonably prudent shareholder standard might appear to smack of a return
to the traditional trust standard, which looks to the level of care an ordinarily prudent person would
exercise in dealing with his or her own property, and which U.S. corporate law has generally abandoned as inappropriate for testing the decisions of corporate management. See, eg., A.L.I. PRINCIPLEs-TD#4, supranote 51, § 4.01(a) reporter's note 3, at 30-31; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 note
on legislative studies and reports (McKinney 1986); H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 63, at 158-59 (rev. ed. 1946); Adkins & Janis, Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate
Directors, 20 Bus. LAw. 817, 819-20 (1965); Dyson, The Director'sLiabilityfor Negligence, 40 IND.
L.J. 341, 344-45 (1965).
145 This reasonable proprietor test is consistent with Professor White's recent argument that
the corporation should be conceived not in strictly economic terms but as "a responsible citizen in its
economic and other activities." See White, How Should We Talk About Corporations?The Lan-

CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY-U.S. LAW

cable referent, there remains the issue of the required confidence level.
The business judgment rule simply represents one alternative form of
confidence level-a very low confidence level, to be sure, for it requires
merely that some rational decisionmakers (even though only, say, one in
ten) might have reached the same decision management did. But the fact
that corporate law has been content to require only this level of confidence for conventional, for-profit decisionmaking does not mandate its
extension to other activities, such as the decision to consider nonshareholder interests. 146 To do so, as we saw at the outset of this subsection, would be to endow management with virtually unlimited discretion
to divert shareholder wealth to any other corporate constituency, no
matter who was selected as the appropriate referent. Management need
only demonstrate that there might be some rational decisionmaker
within the designated category whose particular tastes and preferences
would have led him to make a comparable trade-off. Thus, courts will
almost certainly require a higher level of confidence for decisions premised on nonshareholder interests, whether under the recent statutes or
the general principles discussed in the preceding two subsections. The
inquiry should, therefore, be whether a substantialproportion of the hypothetical decisionmakers-say, one in two or one in three-would have
been willing to make a comparable trade-off. 4 7 And, given such an approach by the courts, it is questionable whether the recent statutes will

have a significant practical impact on corporate decisionmaking generally. To the extent that the recent limitations on liability enacted by Delaware and other states 48 reveal a climate of concern for the protection
guages of Economics and Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416, 1424 (1985). The citizen metaphor requires, in effect, that the corporation be personified as an individual entrepreneur.
146 Another illustration of the application of different confidence levels depending on the nature of the activity is illustrated by the Supreme Court of Delaware's decision in Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), discussed supra at note 72 and accompanying text, and this
perspective helps to explain the case's significance. The effect of the opinion was to isolate the
board's information gathering and deliberative process as a separate element to be reviewed by the
court, and to require (implicitly) a much higher level of confidence, for that element, that a hypothetical decisionmaker would have acted comparably, than has traditionally been required for the
substantive decision itself.
147 The recognition that a higher confidence level should apply when nonshareholder interests
are being advanced supplies a relatively straightforward device for rationalizing the results in a
number of hypotheticals considered above. Thus, upholding the corporation's decision to forego a
highly profitable sale to a North African country out of deference to a voluntary government program, see supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text, simply reflects the fact that, in the face of a
clearly defined governmental request, a substantial number of rational decisionmakers would have
done likewise. And once that threshold is reached, the result is tantamount to that under the business judgment rule. On the other hand, the speculation that a court would enjoin the sale of a close
corporation's South African assets for 30 cents on the dollar, see supranotes 123-126 and accompanying text, represents the conclusion that, while some rational decisionmakers might have been led,
by their ethical beliefs, to make such a sacrifice, the vast majority would not.
149 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1974 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-351(e) (Burns Supp. 1986); OHIo REv. CODE § 1701.59(D) (Anderson Supp. 1987); Act of Nov. 28,
1986, Act No. 1986-145 § 1.
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truly afforded by the business judgment rule, we cannot expect directors
and officers to be very aggressive in taking value from the shareholders
when subjected to an even more rigorous standard of review.149
This leads us back to the alternative position, which sees the shareholder simply as a contract-holder rather than an owner. Because no
shareholder can be expected to purchase a contract that permits management to dissipate, at will, his economic rights in the interest of other
corporate constituencies, the task confronted by the adherents to this position is to come up with an alternative source of limitations on managerial discretion to replace the traditional fiduciary duty of single-minded
loyalty to the shareholder-owners. As an analytical approach to this
task, the contract-holder position may be seen as consistent with the
work of the behavioral economists who have characterized managerial
effort as "satisfying"-geared to meeting minimum performance goalsrather than maximizing.150 Corporate law must therefore fill in the implicit terms of the shareholder's contract-in terms of a reasonable rate
of return, fair treatment and so forth-by specifying management's minimum performance obligation.15 And the most likely determinant of this
obligation will be general business practice, inasmuch as this will typically shape the expectations of the shareholder upon entering into the
contract. Thus, notwithstanding the difference in their theoretical underpinnings, the practical results under the owner and contract-holder views
are likely to converge when it comes to deciding actual cases.
From this perspective, we can see the "reasonable amount of 1re52
sources" requirement of the A.L.I. Principlesof CorporateGovernance
as the vehicle for embodying either the owner or contract-holder views.
Consider, in this regard, a pair of illustrations from the Principlesinvolving a publicly-held corporation with assets of $100 million and annual
earnings in the range of $13 to $15 million.1 53 The corporation owns
three profitable aluminum plants and one plastics plant, which is presently losing $4 million per year and shows no sign of ever becoming profitable. In the first of the illustrations, the corporation sells the plant
property to a real estate developer, but to provide the plant's employees
with an adjustment period prior to its closing, the corporation agrees to
continue to operate the plant for a three month period, at a loss of
149 Further, the requirement that the directors or officers act with appropriate diligence in
informing themselves concerning the decision, see supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text, would
presumably apply to actions in furtherance of nonshareholder interests with at least the same rigor
that it applies to more conventional for-profit activity.
150 See, e.g., R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); Simon, A
BehavioralModel of Rational Choice, 66 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).
151 For a recent example along these lines, see Conard, Thesesfor a CorporateReformation,
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 259, 290-91, 295-95 (1986) (arguing that shareholders should be assured a rate
of return comparable to that of other firms in the same industry, but management should otherwise
be free to pursue alternative objectives).
152 See A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01(c).
153 Id. § 2.01 comment i, illustrations 20-21.
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$500,000. The reporters uphold this decision as a permissible application
of both humanitarian considerations and generally recognized ethical
principles." 4 To the extent that this reflects a conclusion that a substantial number of hypothetical decisionmakers would be willing to make a
comparable arrangement, we can square this conclusion with the above
analysis. In this sense, the recent statutes may be viewed as providing a
source of express validation for the A.L.I. reporters' speculations.
In the second illustration, the corporation rejects an offer to sell the
plant and decides instead to continue operating the plant indefinitely for
the purpose of preserving jobs. The reporters conclude that this decision
cannot be justified out of humanitarian considerations, because the resulting losses are unreasonable in relation to the corporation's earnings,
or as an application of generally recognized ethical principles, because
such principles do not require an employer to make an indefinite sacrifice
of more than one-quarter of its profits in the interests of preserving
jobs. 5 5 Would the illustration come out differently under the recent statutes? Again, the answer necessarily turns on confidence levels. No matter which of the alternative referents is selected, some rational
decisionmakers within the group would be willing to make the sacrifice.
But if the confidence level is set to require that a substantial proportion
of the eligible decisionmakers must be willing-and particularly if the
rational proprietor or shareholder standard is selected-the corporation's
decision must be rejected as extreme. Inasmuch as the vast majority of
persons would be unwilling to make a permanent sacrifice of more than
one-quarter of their annual return in order to perpetuate present levels of
employment, the result becomes the same as that reached by the
reporters.
Approaching these issues as a question of confidence levels accommodates a distinction which was likely implicit in the concerns that led
to enactment of the statutes, but is not reflected in their text. That is the
distinction between foregoing potential gain by preserving the status quo
and incurring new loss by changing it. In theory, a dollar of lost profit
may be no different from a dollar of additional expense, but corporate
executives and other corporate constituencies are likely to think differently.15 6 The impetus for the recent statutes was most likely a recognition that the employees, customers and others come to rely over time on
the preservation of their relationship with the corporation even though
they have no contractual entitlement. Management then, should enjoy
considerably broader discretion when it is perpetuating the current level
154 Id. illustration 21, at 45.
155 Id. illustration 20, at 44-45.
156 Theory and popular sentiment may be reconciled if one phrases the comparison in terms of
utility rather than raw dollars, and recognizes diminishing marginal utility of wealth across the
relevant range of decisionmaking, an issue which has drawn considerable attention from economists.
See, eg., Friedman & Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279

(1948).
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of shareholder profits in order to protect the status of other constituencies, rather than reducing profits to confer new benefits on that constitu-

ency.' 5 7 If most business leaders do in fact recognize such a distinction,
the confidence level approach supplies the vehicle for grafting it on to the

statutes.
As a final comment on these statutes, it has been suggested by one
pair of commentators that, as a result of the Pennsylvania statute, nonshareholder constituencies may expect and demand that their interests be
considered, and may take action if ignored."5 8 Clearly, reading the statutes to embrace such a mandatory component would involve a severe
change in the law, and finds no support in either the language of the
statutes or the legislative history.' 5 9 They simply provide one-way discretion for the board and officers to take into account the enumerated

interests, if they choose to do so. Nonetheless, the statutes may supply
an indirect source of pressure. Surely, community and employee relations operate as de facto limitations on the scope of managerial discre-

tion, just as markets do. Traditionally, in the public forum, management
could justify its decision to close a plant, for example, by explaining that

it was required to act in the best interests of its shareholders." 6 As civic

and labor leaders become familiar with the recent statutes, they may
readily rebut this justification by noting that the legislature has specifically endorsed management's right to balance the concerns of the community and employees against the prospects of shareholder profit.

3.4 WHEN (IF EVER) Is MANAGEMENT OBLIGATED TO PURSUE
OBJECTIVES OTHER THAN SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
MAXIMIZATION?

The final issue is the extent of any affirmative mandate that manage157 This observation is consistent with the decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich.
459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919), where the effect of Henry Ford's alleged plan was to improve the status of
employees and car buyers rather than to maintain it.
158 Newlin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania ShareholderProtection Act, 40 Bus. LAW. 111, 114
(1984).
159 Cf, e.g., Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264,
1279-82 (6th Cir. 1980) (community interest did not require U.S. Steel to continue operations in
Youngstown, Ohio, once board of directors determined they were unprofitable). An interesting
point of comparison here is the U.K. company law, which provides that, in the performance of their
functions, the directors are to have regard for "the interests of the company's employees in general,
as well as the interests of its members," but then denies the employees any right to enforce this
obligation. See Companies Act, 1985, § 309(1), (2).
I have been told that the reason the Ohio statute was amended in 1985 to require that shareholder interests be considered, see OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson 1985) (amended
1986), was to negate any implication that it was intended as a "plant-closing" statute. Telephone
interview with William K. Weisenberg, Director of Government Affairs, Ohio State Bar Association
(Feb. 5, 1985).
160 Cf Hetherington, supra note 83, at 272 ("Certainly managements on occasion find their
announced role of servant of the shareholders convenient in discussions and disputes with other
groups, such as labor unions.").
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ment place some concerns above the goal of profit. Here the implications
of the analysis are the opposite of those in the preceding subsections, for
social responsibility considerations will have a restrictive rather than expansive effect on management's discretion to run the corporation as it
sees fit.
Under the A.L.I. Principles of Corporate Governance, the only
source of such an affirmative obligation is the requirement that the corporation act within the boundaries set by law, to the same extent as a
natural person. 161 The reference to natural persons is apparently intended to embody within the standard162
various commonly recognized exceptions to the duty to obey the law.
If the Principlesare saying simply that the requirement of law obedience applies to corporations as well as natural persons, the point would
hardly be worth discussion. But more is intended. A natural person may
take a calculated risk to violate the law in the belief that the gains from
violation exceed the prospect and penalties for being caught. In the case
of corporations, on the other hand, the commentary to the Principles
takes the position that compliance with the law is not a proper subject for
cost-benefit analysis. 163 As a result, a corporate officer or director who
knowingly causes the corporation to violate the law breaches his or her
duty of good faith. The fact that the director or officer made a business
judgment that the violation was in the best financial interests of the corporation and its shareholders would, therefore, be no defense.1 4 Thus, it
is improper, for example, for a trucking company's management to instruct its drivers to drive at 75 miles per hour, even when management
has concluded, after due investigation, that operating
at that speed would
65
increase corporate profits by almost ten percent.
161 A.L.I. PRINcPLEs-TD1#2, supra note 9, § 2.01(a).
162 According to the comments, these exceptions include the concept of necessity, if obedience
of the law would result in substantial harm to third parties but disobedience would not; the concept
of desuetude, where disobedience is condoned by popular morality and by relevant government authorities; open violations of a law for the purpose of testing its validity or interpretation; violations
such as breach of contract, where the underlying obligation does not necessarily derive independent
support from the norm of law obedience; de minimis violations and isolated circumstances in which
it is widely understood that liability is the price that may be paid for noncompliance. Id. comment g,
at 33-34; see also id. illustration 9, at 35-36 (Sunday closing law as example of desuetude).
163 Id. comment g, at 32-33.
164 See A.L.I. PRINCiPLES-TD#4, supra note 51, § 4.01(a) comment d, at 21-23. See also
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFsrRA L. Rnv. 93, 129-30 (1979) ("Bad faith
may preclude application of the business judgment defense where directors knowingly violate a statute or comparable expression of public policy, even if such a violation is undertaken in the corporation's best interests.").
165 See A.L.I. PRINC1PLEs-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment g, illustration 10, at 36. As
another illustration of this proposition, Professor Melvin Eisenberg, reporter for this part of the
Principles, has discussed the reported SEC investigation of Citibank's violations of European currency laws at its overseas branches. Applying the doctrine discussed in the text, he criticizes the
SEC's decision not to bring an enforcement action to the extent that decision was premised on the
view, reported by some, that Citibank's decision to violate the laws was a legitimate matter for
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While this position would represent the view of many corporate law
commentators and practitioners, a careful examination of the case law
reveals that the issue may not be as settled as the Principlesand commentary make it appear. 166 The reporters rely chiefly upon the opinions in a
series of shareholder derivative suits, under New York law, seeking to
hold directors or officers liable to the corporation for causing it to engage
in unlawful conduct. The most recent, Miller v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co.,167 challenged AT&T's failure to collect a $1.5 million
debt owed the company by the Democratic National Party for communications services at the 1968 presidential nominating convention. The
complaint alleged that this was a violation of federal election law and
sought to compel AT&T to collect the debt and to surcharge AT&T's
directors for the amount of the debt plus interest. The district court dismissed the action on the ground that AT&T's collection procedures were
within the discretion of the directors, 168 but the Third Circuit reversed.
It reasoned that if the issue was simply the failure to pursue a corporate
claim, the business judgment rule would protect the directors' exercise of
discretion, but where the directors' decision is alleged169to be an illegal act,
business judgment protection is no longer available.
Had the analysis stopped there, the decision would provide strong
support for the position taken by the A.L.I. Principles. But the court
added that one of the recognized purposes of the statute at issue was to
check the corporation's power to use its funds to benefit political parties
without shareholder consent, 17 0 and that this shareholder-protection aspect of the violation gave force to the argument that a cause of action
should be available at the shareholders' behest.'7 1 If this passage is read
as critical to the court's conclusion, then the decision is akin to the cases
holding directors liable for illegal loans or investments, also cited by the
A.L.I. reporters as authority for their position,' 7 2 where the laws at issue
are principally intended to protect corporate shareholders and creditors
business judgment. See Eisenberg, CorporateLegitimacy, Conduct, and Governance-Two Models of
the Corporation, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1983).
166 A complicating factor is that virtually all of the decisions arise in response to a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, with the complaint often containing glowing but generalized
allegations of the directors' and officers' misconduct. Thus, they provide no indication of the kind of
facts necessary to warrant actual recovery.
167 Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
168 Miller v. AT&T, 364 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
169 Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d at 762. Subsequent decisions have observed that Miller is limited
to the situation where the directors' conduct itself is alleged to be illegal. The business judgment rule

still applies to the directors' decision not to pursue a corporate right of action to remedy allegedly
illegal actions by others on behalf of the corporation. See Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 824 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 518 n.19
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).

170 Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d at 763 (citing United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948)).

171 Id. at 763.
172 See A.L.I. PRINIPLEs-TD#4, supra note 51, § 4.01(a) reporter's note 11, at 38 (citing
Van Schaick v. Aron, 170 Misc. 520, 534, 10 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (liability of insur-
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from the directors' improvidence. 173 These cases do not support the
broader notion that management should be liable per se to the corporation for causing it-in the interests of profit-to violate laws protecting
third persons generally, which is the essence of the trucking company
example cited above.
Several cases demonstrate, however, that courts may review conduct

by management that violates laws protecting third parties with a higher
level of scrutiny than is traditionally associated with the business judg-

ment rule. A leading example is the decision of the Court of Appeals of

New York in Abrams v. Allen.174 As the comments to the A.L.I. Principles correctly state, 175 the court in that case reversed the dismissal of a
derivative suit alleging that the directors intentionally dismantled and
removed corporate plants, equipment and machinery and curtailed production for the purpose of intimidating and punishing employees. But
basic to the complaint, and ignored by the A.L.I. comments, were the
plaintiffs' allegations that the directors did not take these actions for legitimate business reasons, but yielded to the malice and personal prejudice of the corporation's founder and president, and that the corporation
suffered a great loss as a result.17 6 Thus, while the case demonstrates
that when unlawful conduct is alleged, the court's traditional unwillingness to question the good faith and motives of the directors 177 may no
longer apply, the asserted basis for liability is not the unlawful conduct
per se but the subordination of the best interests of the corporations to
the personal whims of its president.1 7 1 Other cases, particularly in the
antitrust area where violations may be redressed by treble damages, seem
to rest upon the notion that the defendants' conduct in deliberately ex-

posing the corporation to an obvious risk of financial liability, material in
amount, gives rise to a strong presumption of mismanagement-strong
ance company directors for illegal loan and purchase of stock); Broderick v. Marcus, 152 Misc. 413,
417, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455, 460 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (liability of bank directors for losses on illegal loans)).
173 Cf Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of CorporateMisconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. Rav. 1099, 1163-64 (1977) (analyzing Miller as a
negligence per se case).
174 Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).
175 See A.L.I. PRINCIPLEs-TD#4, supra note 51, § 4.01(a) comment d, at 21.
176 Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. at 54-55, 74 N.E.2d at 306.
177 See, eg., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 IlL. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968), discussed supra
in subsection 3.1.2.
178 Upon remand, the trial court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the directors dismantled the equipment and removed the plants solely to defeat the employees' strike, and dismissed
the action. Abrams v. Allen, 113 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1952). For other examples of cases where
the court's conclusion that the directors could be held liable to the corporation for unlawful conduct
appears to turn on allegations that the conduct was undertaken for personal purposes, see
DiTomasso v. Loverro, 250 A.D. 206, 209, 293 N.Y.S. 912, 916-17, aff'd mem, 276 N.Y. 551, 12
N.E.2d 570 (1937) (contract to restrain competition that directors knew was unlawful and entered
into for personal gain is void); Hill v. Murphy, 212 Mass. 1, 2-3, 98 N.E. 781, 782 (1912) (defendants
required to reimburse corporation for libel judgment where libel was circulated for personal ends of
defendants).
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enough, at least, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. 179
But, for our purposes, it is one thing to say that a showing of unlawful conduct may lead courts to withhold the attitude of deference embodied by the business judgment rule, as the foregoing cases illustrate, and
another to say that unlawful conduct is per se beyond the permissible
discretion of corporate directors and officers, as the A.L.I. Principles
seem to suggest. The former proposition is still entirely consistent with
shareholder wealth maximization as management's polestar objective;
the latter clearly is not. The A.L.I. position derives its strongest support
from the cases involving illegal payments out of corporate funds. The
leading case remains a 1909 lower court decision, Roth v. Robertson,"80
where the manager of a corporation operating an amusement park paid
"hush money" to permit the corporation to continue operating on Sundays, in violation of the blue laws. The manager testified that a large part
of the corporation's business occurred on Sundays and that he believed
that making the payment was in the best interests of the corporation.
Nonetheless, the court required him to reimburse the corporation. It
reasoned that if it is unlawful to operate on Sunday, then it must be unlawful as well to pay money to silence opposition to the violation, so that
any argument that the payment was made in the interests of the corporation is inadequate as a matter of law. It added that "[t]o hold any other
rule would be establishing a dangerous precedent, and tacitly
countenancing the wasting of corporate funds for purposes of corrupting
public morals."' 8 1
That Roth retains some continuing validity is illustrated by the
Third Circuit's reliance upon the opinion in Miller v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co, 182 coupled with its conclusion that the allegation
of the illegal payment, in itself, sufficed to show damage to the corporation.' 83 As we have seen, however, the significance of Miller is diluted by
179 See, e.g., Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277, 1285-86 (10th Cir. 1969); Parish v.

Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 80-81, 242 A.2d 512, 543-44 (1967); cf Knopfler v. Bohen, 15 A.D.2d 922, 225 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1962) (excusing requirement that plaintiff make a
pre-suit demand upon the board). In the Parish case it was found, following remand, that the defendants were not guilty of gross negligence or culpable mismanagement, and this decision was upheld upon appeal. The antitrust cases have generated the most substantial literature upon the
directors' and officers' liability to the corporation for unlawful conduct. See, e.g., Blake, The Shareholders' Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 143, 157-78 (1961); Forte, Liabilities of
Corporate Officers for Violation ofFiduciaryDuties Concerning the Antitrust Laws, 40 IND. L.J. 313
(1965); Harris, DerivativeActions Based Upon Alleged Antitrust Violations, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV.

337 (1971).
180 Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 118 N.Y.S. (Sup. Ct. 1909).
181 Id at 346, 118 N.Y.S. at 353.
182 Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974).
183 Id. at 762-63. In another relatively recent case, the court, without extensive analysis, required the corporation's former general manager to reimburse it for illegal political contributions
paid from its funds. Capital Elec. Power Ass'n v. Phillips, 240 So. 2d 133, 136-37 (Miss. 1970).
Where the illegal payment is initiated by a corporate employee, recovery by the corporation will

CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY-U.S.

LAW

the court's reliance on the shareholder-protection objectives of the statute at issue. 184 Moreover, the Second Circuit's decision in Schwartz v.
Romnes,'8 5 decided in the same year as Miller, contains some interesting
dicta that points in the opposite direction. The case was a derivative suit
challenging, as illegal under the New York election law, a corporation's
contribution in support of a state transportation bond issue. The district
court held that the contribution was illegal and, as a result, granted summary judgment holding the corporation's directors and officers personally liable for the contribution.' 8 6 The Second Circuit reversed on the
issue of illegality, but, noting the directors' claim of good faith belief that
the contribution would benefit the corporation, the court added that even
if it had found the contribution to be illegal, it would at a minimum
remand the case for trial on the issue of the reasonableness of the directors' actions.1 87 Thus, it is unclear just how much of the Roth rule
remains.
When we move from the illegal payments cases to the issue of management's liability for illegal corporate conduct generally, support for the
per se approach is much weaker. The post-Roth cases-principally in the
antitrust area-suggest that violation of the law does not itself establish
breach of duty to the corporation18 8 or hold that the plaintiff must nonetheless prove that the violation caused independent injury
to the corpora89
tion in the sense of damage exceeding any benefit.'
generally be consistent with the agency law doctrine that authority to do illegal acts is not readily
inferred, unless customary in the principal's business. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 34 comment g, at 121 (1957). In the Capital Electric Power case, however, the lower court had
found that the contributions had been ratified by the board of directors, 240 So. 2d at 135, so that
this rationale would not apply.
184 See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
185 Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974).
186 Schwartz v. Romnes, 357 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974).
187 495 F.2d at 848 & n.5. The court noted that the directors' reliance on advice of counsel
would also be an issue on remand. The wording of the passage suggests, however, that reasonableness might exist independent of such reliance.
188 See Polon v. Huffines, 446 F.2d 384, 386-B7 (7th Cir. 1971); Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc.
136, 154, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727, 744-45 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
The leading case on this issue is Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d
270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 267 A.D. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944), where the court held that
directors were not liable to the corporation for causing it to violate the Sherman Act, so long as they
acted with good faith and reasonable care. It rejected the argument that the violations rendered the
defendants automatically liable, and stated:
Whether directors are personally liable for committing acts prohibited by statute depends
upon the nature of the prohibited act; whether the statute is plain and unambiguous, and
whether it contains a limitation or restriction on the powers of the corporation or the
powers or duties of the directors themselves.
Id. at 204, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 274. Because the court emphasized that the directors had no reason to
believe their conduct was illegal, however, the decision is narrower than the discussion in the text.
189 Diamond v. Davis, 263 A.D. 68, 69, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582, 583 (1941); Smiles v. Elfred,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, at 14, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.); Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Spinella v. Heights Ice Corp., 186 Misc. 996, 62 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Hoffman v. Abbot,
180 Misc. 590, 594, 40, N.Y.S.2d 521, 525 (Sup. Ct. 1943); cf Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 763 &
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Nonetheless, while the more recent cases may call into question

whether a violation of law-even a knowing violation- constitutes a per
se breach of the director's or officer's duty to the corporation, other corporate law doctrines make clear that unlawful conduct cannot be viewed
as an eligible means of doing business simply because the projected benefits exceed the costs, and these doctrines provide indirect support for the
A.L.I. position. For example, state indemnification statutes typically
prohibit indemnification of the director's or officer's liability and defense
expenses in a criminal proceeding unless he had no reasonable cause to
believe that his conduct was unlawful. 190 And the syntax of these statutes makes clear that this prohibition applies even though the director or
officer acted in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believed was in the
best interests of the corporation.1 9 1 Also, as a response to the illegal
political contributions and questionable foreign payments episodes of the
mid-1970s, the view has emerged that a principal monitoring function of
the board of directors is to establish mechanisms to assure the corporation's ongoing compliance with the law.' 92 In other words, the asserted

obligation of the director is not only to refrain from violating the law
himself but also to affirmatively monitor for violations by others within
the corporation, and no suggestion has been made that a distinction
n.5 (acknowledging, and distinguishing, this case law). The position represented by these cases has
been referred to as the "net loss" rule. See, eg., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 7.16 comment e, at 211-13, reporter's note 7, at 221 (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1986); Coffee, supra note 173, at 1215-22. Several of these decisions also suggest that the
necessary damage to the corporation must be over and above any fines or litigation expenses that
resulted from the violation.
190 See, ag., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(b) (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)
(1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723(a) (McKinney 1986); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 8.51(a)(3) (1984). Indiana's recent corporate law revision adopts a significant change in this
scheme by permitting indemnification so long as a director had reasonable cause to believe his conduct was lawful. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-8(a)(3)(a) (Bums Supp. 1986). Thus, indemnification
is not foreclosed simply because the director was aware of some risk that his actions would be found
illegal.
191 CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(h) (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1983);
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 723(a) (McKinney 1986); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.51(a)(1),(2)
(1984).
There is, however, an important distinction between the indemnification issue and the question
of the manager's discretion to cause the corporation to break the law. Where the state has chosen to
penalize the individual manager, indemnification operates to undo that penalty and, therefore, arguably frustrates public policy. Where, on the other hand, the state has chosen to penalize the
corporation, these concerns are not present, and the only public policy question is whether the manager should be permitted to view the corporate penalty as another cost of doing business.
192 See, ag., A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#4, supra note 51, § 4.01(a)(l)-(2) comment c, at 47-50;
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1610
(1978); Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Directorof the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW.
1799, 1801-02 (1976); Small, The Evolving Role of the Directorin Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1374-89 (1979); Statement of the Business Roundtable, supra note 137, at 2101
(1978); Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard--Safe Harboror Uncharted Reel?, 35 Bus. LAW.
919, 929-30 (1980); additional authorities cited at A.L.I. PRINCIPLES--TD#4, supra note 51,
§ 4.01(a)(1)-(2) reporter's note 4, at 53.
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should be drawn where the decision to disobey the law represents an
informed business judgment.
Some commentators have questioned why a legislative decision to
make an activity illegal should automatically operate to remove that activity from the corporate manager's discretion. Professor Fischel has
pressed this reasoning to the point of concluding that if the benefits to the
corporation exceed the statutory penalty, compliance with the law is
"undesirable from a personal as well as social perspective."' 9 3 This extreme view has drawn criticism from management circles, 194 and, as the
A.L.I. Principlesindicate, been rejected by the legal mainstream.
It is by no means clear that all violations of law should be lumped
together and placed beyond the realm of cost-benefit calculations. Two
rationales support the general norm of corporate law obedience at all
costs. The first is the imputed tastes and preferences of the corporation's
shareholders, who typically conform their personal conduct to the law
notwithstanding opportunities to gain from violating it. They would presumably desire that they behave likewise. But shareholder sentiment will
turn somewhat upon the moral turpitude implicit in the illegality. Driving at 75 miles per hour and armed robbery both violate the law, but
most people would recognize a clear distinction between the two as eligible subjects for a cost-benefit evaluation. The second rationale is one of
economic efficiency, and rests on the premise that the projected cost of
the violation-in terms of the magnitude of the penalties and the
probability of conviction faced by the corporation-generally understates
the true cost to society. Commentators have discussed the factors which
inhibit the law's ability to equate the expected sanction to the approximate social loss, 195 including the problem of regulatory failure in general. 19 6 Thus, the likely alternative to voluntary corporate law obedience
is more intense investigation and prosecution, and with it substantial enforcement costs and the loss of personal freedom and discretion.1 97 But,
again, the fact that society tends to "underprice" illegal activity does not
mean that the social harms caused by such activity will inevitably exceed
the private benefits. As David Engels has pointed out, if the implicit
assumption is that society criminalizes only that conduct that it seeks to
bar irrespective of cost, the corporation should be compelled to expend
whatever resources are needed to eliminate any possibility of violations
193 Fischel, supra note 22, 1271; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of
Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1155, 1177 (1982).
194 See Andrews, Letter from the Editor, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 1, 2.
195 See, eg., Engel, supra note 16, at 43 n.141; Stone, The Place ofEnterpriseLiability in the
Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 24-27 (1980).
196 See, eg., Clark, supra note 28, at 199-200, 205; Weiss, supra note 23, at 377-410.
197 See generally Andrews, supra note 26, at 138-39; Clark, supra note 28, at 203-05 (but also
noting the collective action problems attendant to voluntary obedience); Mashaw, supra note 25, at
126-27; McKean, Collective Choice, inSOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT
109, 127 (J.McKie ed. 1974).
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by its subordinates. 198 To recognize this as an excessive burden is to
acknowledge that there must inevitably be some point at which a costbenefit decision to permit the risk of unlawful conduct is appropriate.
As a final note, let us consider whether there are obligations in addition to law obedience which operate as mandates upon managerial discretion. In Abrams v. Allen, 199 the court listed as one of the alternative
grounds upon which liability might be based "using the corporation's
property for the doing of an unlawful or immoral act" and it observed
"[t]hat the public policy of this state and nation is opposed to the closing
or removal of factories, for such purposes as are here asserted, is obvious." 2 "° Some have read this to suggest that public policy, however defined, may supply an independent check on management.20 1 Others have
argued that management is obliged to act ethically. 20 2 From this perspective, the SEC's enforcement campaign against questionable foreign
payments in the mid-1970s may be seen as an attempt, through the
means of disclosure regulation, to impose a form of public policy or ethical limitation upon business conduct that might not be illegal in the particular countries involved.2 "3 In any event, the A.L.I. Principles have
sought to make clear that the mandatory component of the manager's
obligation is limited to law obedience. The commentary recognizes that
adherence to ethical considerations is permissible, not mandatory, because "such an obligation would be too onerous and imprecise to enforce
fairly.' ' 2 4 On the other hand, the commentary also suggests that the
norm of law obedience should be interpreted broadly, which opens the
door to possible arguments of public policy: "[T]he corporation should
not rest simply on past precedents or an unduly literal reading of statutes
and regulations, but should give weight to all the considerations that the
198 Engel, supra note 16, at 4445; see also Mashaw, supra note 25, at 125-26.

199 Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947). See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.

200 297 N.Y. at 56, 74 N.E.2d at 306-07.
201 See, eg., Note, Use of the Derivative Suit by Groups Foreign to the Corporationto Prevent
Corporate Violation of Law and Public Policy, 57 YALE L.J. 489 (1948); see also Coffee, supra note

173, at 1190-97.
202 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 28, at 33 (presumed desire of shareholders is for management "to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both
those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom"). It is not as surprising as it might
first appear that Professor Friedman advocates a mandatory ethical responsibility. Consistent with
his general view that social responsibility should not be left to the manager's discretion, he apparently sees ethics as something that (if generally desired by shareholders) should be embodied in the
standard obligation, rather than open to individual choice.
203 See Coffee, supra note 173, at 1250-56; REPORT OF THE SECuRrriES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 9-10 (Comm.
Print 1976) (discussion of policy statement that board of directors should issue); id. at 44-48 (discussion of response by business community). For additional discussions of the SEC's activities on this
issue, see Freeman, The Legality of the SEC's Management Fraud Program, 31 Bus. LAW. 1295

(1976); Stevenson, The SEC and Foreign Bribery, 32 Bus. LAW. 53 (1976).
204 A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment h, at 38.
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courts would deem proper to take into account in their determinations,
including relevant principles, policies, and legislative purposes. "205
SECTION 4
MANAGERIAL DISCRETION TO MAKE CHARITABLE AND
PHILANTHROPIC DONATIONS

4.1

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

This section considers, in detail, the area of corporate voluntarism
that has received the fullest attention in the case law and statutes-corporate charity and philanthropy. The development of the U.S. law on
this subject can be divided into four phases.20 6 In the first, represented
principally by cases decided during the last two decades of the nineteenth
century, the courts took a strict view of the corporation's charter and
applied the ultra vires doctrine to set aside corporate donations or
pledges. The expenditures at issue in these cases did not involve charity
in any conventional sense, but contributions to activities likely to promote business for the corporation. Thus, in a leading case, Davis v. Old
Colony R.R., 2 ° 7 the court set aside as ultra vires agreements by a railroad
and a musical instrument manufacturer to guarantee the expenses of a
musical festival, with language suggesting that the possible existence of
offsetting benefits was irrelevant.20 8 Other decisions in this phase seem to
rest on the court's belief that the business to be generated as a result of
the contribution was too remote or speculative to permit the
expenditure.20 9
The strict ultra vires position was not universal among courts, however. At the same time as this phase (and even before2 10 ), some courts
were upholding, as incidental to the corporation's powers, contributions
to funds and projects likely to generate business for the corporation.2 11
205 Id. comment g, at 33. But cf Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 236, 43 N.E.2d 18, 21
(1942) (suggesting that corporate directors have no obligation to go beyond letter of law).
206 For a comprehensive collection of the various statutory and case law developments through
1970, see generally Blumberg, supra note 13.
207 Davis v. Old Colony R.R., 131 Mass. 258 (1881).
208 Id. at 275-76. See also Brinson Ry. v. Exchange Bank, 16 Ga. App. 425, 85 S.E. 634 (1915)
(donation to erect public school and to promote town along railroad line).
209 See Military Interstate Ass'n v. Savannah, T. & I. of H. Ry., 105 Ga. 420, 31 S.E. 200
(1898) (subscription to stock of local festival); McCrory v. Chambers, 48 II. App. 445, 452-53
(1882) (contribution to fund to persuade local manufacturer to remain in town). Professor
Blumberg notes that the corporations at issue in McCrory and other decisions between 1885 and
1908 that set aside contributions to attract or retain local business were banks, and the holdings
might therefore be explained by a judicial tendency to construe bank charters narrowly. See
Blumberg, supra note 13, at 186-87.
210 See Vandall v. South San Francisco Dock Co., 40 Cal. 83 (1870) (upholding payment to
railroad by corporation formed to improve real estate, for purpose of improving service and reducing
fares); Whetstone v. Ottawa Univ., 13 Kan. 320, 339-41 (1874) (enforcing town development corporation's gift of land to private university).
211 See, ag., Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International Military Encampment Co., 140 Ill. 248, 263-
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As characterized by courts and commentators over time,2 12 the essential
test that emerged from these decisions-and what may be thought as the
second phase of the case law-was whether the expenditure produced a
direct or immediate benefit to the corporation.2 13
While these early cases involved expenditures for business, the resulting direct benefit test led courts, beginning at the turn of the century,
to allow one class of corporate activity that did have a philanthropic dimension-programs to benefit the welfare of the corporation's employees. Thus, in 1896, a New York court upheld the provision of employee
housing by Steinway & Sons, the piano manufacturer, adjacent to its new
factory site in a then remote area, along with the corporation's contributions to permit establishment of a church, school, library and bath in the
community. 2 14 And in 1909, an appellate court in the same state permitted a life insurance company to purchase land for a hospital to treat its
employees with tuberculosis.2 1 5
The direct benefit rule provided no authority, however, for corporate support of organizations that provided benefits that were dispersed
among the community as a whole. This foreclosed support for higher
education2 1 6 as well as national and local charities. To a considerable
extent, corporations made contributions nonetheless to local institutions
such as hospitals, to the YMCA, and, with the advent of World War I, to
65, 29 N.E. 1044, 1047-48 (1892) (contribution by Chicago hotel to military exhibition to be held in
or near city); Huntington Brewing Co. v. McGrew, 64 Ind. App. 273, 278-82, 112 N.E. 534, 536-37
(1916) (donation by brewery to fund to attract other factories to town); Virgil v. Virgil Practice
Clavier Co., 33 Misc. 200, 68 N.Y.S. 335 (Sup. Ct. 1900); (establishment of piano school by corporation that manufactured instrument to teach piano playing); cf Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17
Misc. 43, 47, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 722 (Sup. Ct. 1896) (gifts of pianos to fairs and musical artists; court
determined that it need not decide whether expenses exceeded just limits because plaintiff acquiesced
in them). For an example of a case on the other side of the line, see Orpheum Theatre & Realty Co.
v. Seavey & Flarsheim Brokerage Co., 197 Mo. App. 661, 199 S.W. 257 (1917) (setting aside donation by brokerage corporation to assist theater in relocating, because corporation owned no property
near theatre's new location).
212 See, eg., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 149, 98 A.2d 581, 584, appealdismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953); A.L.I. PRINcIPLEs-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 reporter's note 2, at
48; Blumberg, supra note 13, at 169-70; Davis, The Application of the Doctrine of Ultra Vires to
Expenditures of Corporations Outside the Usual Course of Business-Some Elementary Principles
Recalled, 1 B.U.L. REv. 9, 109 (1921); Garrett, CorporateDonationsto Charity, 4 Bus. LAW. 28,2830 (1948).
213 One commentator, writing in 1921, described the limitation embodied in the direct benefit
test as follows: "A corporation may not contribute to a charity as such nor donate from its funds to
a community welfare enterprise or humanitarian undertaking from which it would only share in the
benefits in common with the rest of the community." Davis, supra note 212, at 110.
214 Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 45, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 720-21 (1896). But see,
People ex rel. Maloney v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 175 Ill. 125, 51 N.E. 664 (1898) (setting aside
establishment of company town as ultra vires).
215 People ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 136 A.D. 150, 120 N.Y.S. 649
(1909); cf also Hutton v. West Cork Ry., 23 Ch. D. 654, 672-73 (1883) (dicta of Bowen, J., that
railroad could provide reasonable benefits for its employees if it were continuing in business).
216 See Worthington v. Worthington, 10 A.D. 332, 336, 91 N.Y.S. 443, 445 (1905) (dicta that it
was doubtful a gift to Columbia University could be satisfied with corporate funds).
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wartime relief agencies such as the Red Cross.2 17 Further, following the
war, local community chests emerged with the active involvement of the
business sector.2 18
With this growing call upon the corporate coffers as a source of
charitable support, business and community leaders looked to the legislature for formal authorization. And some legislatures responded. In
1917, Texas became the first state to enact a statute expressly authorizing
corporate donations. 219 The other statutes of the decade were limited to
the wartime emergency, however. In 1918, Congress authorized national
banks to make contributions to the Red Cross, for the duration of the
war, out of their net profits otherwise available for dividends, 22 0 and New
York permitted corporations to make contributions to further the war
effort. 221 The next year, Illinois, as a part of its new General Corporation
Law, included an express power to aid governmental policy in time of
war. But during the 1920s broader statutes were enacted. Three statesNew York, Ohio and Tennessee-joined Texas in providing general authorizations for corporate charitable contributions.2 22
There were case law developments as well during the 1920s. In
Armstrong Cork Co. v. H.A. Meldrum Co.,223 the court upheld a corporation's contribution to local colleges to help endow their business administration curricula. While the court found a direct benefit to the
corporation, the benefits it cited-good will and the potential for better
trained employees-have a community-wide character that distinguishes
the decision from the prior law. 224 And, in a 1924 decision upholding
the constitutionality of a railroad regulatory statute that exempted ministers and employees of charities from prohibitions on free passes, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska observed in dicta that it saw no reason why
a railroad could not make reasonable donations of its funds to aid in
217 See F. ANDREWS, CORPORATION GIVING 22-32 (1952); M. HEALD, supra note 134, at 5052. Professor Heald notes that the YMCA "had pioneered in the promotion of company giving
before the war." Id. at 50.
218 See M. HEALD, supra note 134, ch. 5.
219 Act of Feb. 13, 1917, ch. 15, § 1, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 25.
220 Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 80, 40 Stat. 558. This was a response to the "Red Cross Dividend" program, begun in 1917. Under that program, participating corporations declared a special
dividend and sought authorization from each shareholder to pay his or her dividend directly to the

Red Cross. See F. ANDREWS, supra note 217, at 26-28.
221 General Corp. Law § 6(12), 1919 Ill. Laws 312, 318; Act of Apr. 16, 1918, ch. 240, 1918
N.Y. Laws 885.
222 Act of Apr. 9, 1923, ch. 190, 1923 N.Y. Laws 237; Act of Feb. 19, 1920, 1920 Ohio Laws
1245; Act. of Apr. 9, 1925, ch. 59, 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts 130.
223 Armstrong Cork Co. v. H.A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922).
224 Consistent in result is an English case, decided two years earlier, which upheld a substantial
gift by a chemical manufacturer to various universities to further scientific education and research.
The court was willing to defer to the judgment of the board of directors that the gift was in the longterm profit interest of the corporation. Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co., [1921] 1 Ch. 359, 367-69

(1920).
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good works.2 25
Collectively, these legislative and judicial developments were the
end of the direct benefit phase and ushered in the third phase, in which
the corporate charity and philanthropy could be justified on the basis of
the corporation's long-term interest in acts that benefited the community
as a whole.
Parallel trends may be seen in the federal income tax laws during
the period. In creating the charitable deduction in 1917, the War Revenue Act limited its availability to individual taxpayers.2 26 The next year,
Congress rejected a proposal to extend it to corporations, in part out of
concerns over the propriety of recognizing the directors' right to make
donations with the shareholders' money.22 7 In 1921, however, the Treasury adopted a regulation embodying the direct benefit rule as the test for
permitting corporations to deduct charitable donations as ordinary and
necessary business expenses.22 8 Under this standard, the courts upheld
deductions for corporate donations to a hospital229 and to a community
charitable fund23 0 where, in each case, the corporation was the largest
employer in the town so that its employees would be the principal beneficiaries. In 1934, however, the Supreme Court determined that a corporation's contributions to the local community chest were not deductible
given the absence of a finding of direct benefit.2 3 1 This decision worked
to reintensify the push by community chest leaders to obtain an independent charitable deduction for corporations, 23 2 and their efforts succeeded with the Act of 1935, which permitted corporations to deduct
charitable contributions of up to five percent of their taxable income, 33 a
limit that was raised to ten percent in 1981.234
Interest in clarifying management's power to make charitable de225 State ex rel. Sorenson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 112 Neb. 248, 255-56, 199 N.W. 534, 537
(1924).
226 See War Revenue Act, ch. 63 § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
227 See 56 CONG. REc. 10, 419-21, 426-28 (1918).
228 The regulation provided:
Corporations are not entitled to deduct from gross income contributions made to religious,
charitable, scientific or educational corporations, even though such contributions are made
to the Red Cross or other war activities. Donations made by a corporation for purposes
connected with the operation of its business, when limited to charitable institutions, hospitals, or educational institutions conducted for the benefit of its employees or their dependents, are a proper deductions as ordinary and necessary expenses. Donations which
legitimately represent a considerationfor a benefitflowing directly to the corporation as an
incident of its business are allowable deductions from gross income.
Treas. Reg. 45, art. 562, T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 352, 501 (1921) (emphasis added).
229 Coming Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 798, 800-01 (D.C. Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S.
742 (1930).
230 American Rolling Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1930).
231 Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 289, 293-94 (1934).
232 See M. HEALD, supra note 134, at 156-71.
233 Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016.
234 See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (1982).
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ductions revived in the late 1940s. By 1948, only 15 states had enacted
statues on the issue. 235 Nonetheless, corporate giving had blossomed into
an established practice, questions of legal authority notwithstanding,
with corporate donations in 1945 reaching $266 million, equal to 1.24%
of net profits.2 36 Speaking to the American Bar Association's Section of
Corporation, Banking and Mercantile Law in 1948, Ray Garrett, Sr.,
chairman of its Committee on Business Corporations (predecessor to the
present Committee on Corporate Laws), observed that: "[S]ome of these
donations can be justified on the common law basis of direct corporate
benefit and some are sanctioned by recently enacted corporate statues,
but the others rest solely upon public approval and the current general
acceptance of the idea by stockholders. 2 3 7 To remove any doubt regarding the propriety of such donations, Garrett proposed that the Committee on Business Corporations draft a model statute for use by state
legislators interested in the topic.23 The Committee obliged and, in
March 1949, circulated a memorandum to all secretaries of state and
state bar associations recommending adoption of a statute empowering
the corporation "[t]o make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes."2'3 9 When the Model Business
Corporation Act was published in September 1950, this provision was
codified as the first clause of section 4(m). 2' The combined backing of
the corporate bar and charitable organizations proved a potent force at
the state level, and by 1959, forty-one states had enacted statutes authorizing corporate giving.24 1
The 1950s also saw the issue of corporate giving reach the courts for
the first time in thirty years, and the result was to remove any remaining
doubt concerning the corporation's power to contribute its funds to institutions that benefit the community generally. In what was to become the
leading case on the subject, A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow,2 42 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld a manufacturing corporation's
235 See Garrett, supra note 212, at 31-32.
236 See F. ANDREWS, supra note 217, at 42-43.
237 See Garrett, supra note 212, at 28. Several other commentators writing at this time made
essentially the same point, noting the absence of decided cases since the 1920s and interpreting this
as a sign of general public acquiescence in the corporation's emerging role as philanthropist. See
Bell, CorporationSupport ofEducation: The Legal Basis, 38 A.B.A. J. 119, 120 (1952); de Capriles &
Garrett, Legality of CorporateSupport of Education: A Survey of CurrentDevelopments, 38 A.B.A. J.
209, 210 (1952). See also Gibson, Corporate Contributionsto Charity and Enabling Legislation, 14
Bus. LAW. 434, 439 (1959); Prunty, Love and the Business Corporation,46 VA. L. REV. 467, 471

(1960).
238 See Garrett, supra note 212, at 33-34.
239 See de Capriles & Garrett, supra note 237, at 211.
240 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 4(m) (1950), reprinted in 6 Bus. LAW. 1, 5 (1950). The
language has survived, unchanged, to the present statute. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 3.02(13) (1984).
241 See F. ANDREWS, supra note 217, at 234-35; Prunty, supra note 237, at 469-70.
242 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861
(1953).
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pledge of $1,500 to Princeton University on both common law and statutory grounds. The court first traced the history of the direct benefit test
and concluded that the more recent cases "illustrate how courts, while
adhering to the terms of the common-law rule, have applied it very
broadly to enable worthy corporate donations with indirect benefits to
the corporation, 2 4 3 and that under this approach, expenses to support
private education, could readily be justified as for the corporation's benefit.2' The court also pointed out that the expenses were authorized by
the New Jersey statute, first enacted in 1930,245 and rejected the plaintiff's constitutional challenge to the statute's application to corporations
predating its enactment.2 4 6
In 1955, the Supreme Court of California upheld a $5,000 pledge for
the construction of a local hospital, signed by the corporation's president,
who was also its general manager and 73% shareholder.2 4 7 The opinion
is noteworthy because the court found it unnecessary to dwell upon the
corporation's power to make the pledge per se 24 and focused solely on
the fact that the pledge could be binding upon the corporation in the
absence of evidence of approval by the board of directors. Concluding
that the pledge was within the president's implied authority, as a reasonable means of benefiting the corporation and promoting its business interests, 249 the court observed in passing:
It is a matter of common knowledge that the trend on the part of the
prosperous business concern is steadily in the direction of making substantial charitable contributions in the community in which it is located and does business. Such donations are generally considered for
its benefit as a means of increasing goodwill and promoting
patronage.23 °
Finally, in a 1958 test case, the Supreme Court of Utah found as
within the corporation's implied powers a $5,000 contribution by the
Union Pacific Railroad Co. to a foundation it had created for charitable,
scientific, religious and educational purposes. 25 1 The court's opinion
Id. at 151, 98 A.2d at 585.
Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
Act of Apr. 14, 1930, ch. 105, 1930 N.J. Laws 353.
A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. at 154-60, 98 N.J. at 586-90.
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Pacific Grape Prods., 45 Cal. 2d 634, 290 P.2d 481 (1955).
California had enacted a statute based upon the A.B.A. model in 1949. See Act of Jul. 18,
1949, ch. 997, § 3.5, 1949 Cal. Stat. 1829-30 (enacting CAL. CORP. CODE § 802(g)). The pledge
predated the statute, however, and the court's opinion did not discuss the statute or its application.
249 Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Pacific Grape Prods., 45 Cal. 2d at 639, 290 P.2d at 484.
250 Id. at 638, 290 P.2d at 483.
251 Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958). In addition to
making the implied powers argument accepted by the court, the corporation had contended that the
contribution was permitted by a 1955 Utah statute adopting the ABA model language. See Act of
Feb. 10, 1955, ch. 22, 1955 Utah Laws 39, 40 (enacting UTAH CODE ANN. § 16.2-14(8)). The court
declined to consider the statutory justification, however, in light of Utah's policy requiring a statute
to include express authorization to be given retrospective effect, and therefore premised its holding
243
244
245
246
247
248
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smacks strongly of the business judgment rule. It reviewed the testimony
of senior management concerning the benefits created by such contributions and the long-run benefits to the shareholders and concluded that,
given the implausibility that experienced executives would make the contributions unless confident that the corporation would receive offsetting
benefits over the foreseeable future, the matter should be left to their
sound discretion.25 2
Thus, by the end of the 1950s the legal doctrine had caught up with
the reality of the corporate philanthropic practices that had become prevalent in the years since the First World War. The vast majority of the
states had enacted statutes authorizing corporate donations, with no requirement of a direct and immediate quid pro quo to the corporation.
And several courts-in fact, every court presented with the question
1920s-had reached the same result even in
since the beginning of the
2 53
the absence of a statute.

Benefit to the corporation was not irrelevant, however. The judicial
opinions and most of the commentary emphasized the indirectbenefits to
the corporation, in the sense of good will and public relations, the ability
to attract qualified employees, the long-run economic and social health of
the communities in which the corporation operates and the like. Thus,
the third phase of the law's development may be characterized as requiring the prospect of offsetting benefits in order to legitimate the corporation's power to make the donation, but not requiring any detailed
showing of the nature and amount of those benefits or of the likelihood
that they would suffice to pay for the donation.
Against this background, the important A.P. Smith2 54 decision may
be read as what amounts to a fourth phase in the law's development, in
which the corporation has the power to be altruistic and donate its funds
irrespective of any prospect of quid pro quo, just as if it were an individual.2"' The court observed:
exclusively on the corporation's implied power in the absence of the statute. Union Pac. R.R., 8
Utah 2d at 103-04, 329 P.2d at 399-400.
252 Union Pac. tKR. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d at 105-07, 329 P.2d at 401-02. There was a
strong dissent by one justice, who argued that the contribution was beyond the corporation's implied
power under traditional principles and that the 1955 statute could not be applied retroactively to
uphold it. Ia at 107-14, 329 P.2d at 402-06 (Worthen, J., dissenting).
253 Nonetheless, some legal commentators remained cautious. Writing in 1958, Dean Elvin
Latty described the state statutes and concluded: "Most of these statutory provisions, however, seem
to leave an opening for a conservative court still to require a fairly direct benefit to the corporation;
one cannot count always on the liberality and breadth of vision revealed in A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v.
Barlow." Latty, Some MiscellaneousNovelties in the New CorporationStatutes, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1958, at 363, 369 (footnotes omitted).
254 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861
(1953).
255 This view of a fourth phase of the law also derives support from a literal reading of the
various state statutes, which grant the corporation authority to make donations in absolute terms,
and contain no mention of corporate benefit. Indeed, some specifically state that the authority exists
irrespective of any corporate benefit. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(e) (West 1977); N.J. STAT.
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It seems to us that just as the conditions prevailing when corporations
were originally created required that they serve public as well as private interests, modem conditions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members
of the communities within which they operate. Within this broad concept there is no difficulty in sustaining, as incidental to their proper
objects and in aid of the public welfare, the power of corporations to
contribute corporate funds within reasonable limits in support of academic institutions.2 5 s
Whether most contemporary courts would be willing to regard a
corporation's power to be philanthropic as entirely independent from its
business self-interest will be discussed in subsection 4.3. For purposes of
the present historical overview, it suffices to note that the most recent
corporate charity case, while containing several distinguishing facts, is
consistent with this view of a new, fourth phase. The case, Theodora
Holding Corp. v. Henderson,217 involved a challenge by a 27% shareholder of a personal holding company to the company's gift of $528,000
in stock to a charitable trust controlled by the majority shareholder. The
gift was to be used to help fund a western camp for underprivileged boys,
for which the corporation had earlier donated the land as well. The Delaware Court of Chancery noted that the Delaware statute25 (which followed the ABA model) contained no limiting language and must be
"construed to authorize any reasonable gift of a charitable or educational
nature. ' 259 While one may argue in support of this broad view that the
concept of corporate benefit (as distinct from individual shareholder benefit) has little meaning in the case of a personal holding company, the
opinion does not suggest that this should be viewed as a limiting factor.
The court said simply that the governing test was one of reasonableness
and, observing that the then applicable federal income tax limitation on
corporate charitable deductions of five percent of net income furnished a
helpful guide, upheld the gift with a brief discussion of how the general
societal gains from the gift far outweighed its after tax cost to the shareholders. 2" We will have more to say about the Theodora case in subsection 4.3 below.

4.2

THE LIMITS OF MANAGEMENT'S DISCRETION TO MAKE
CORPORATE DONATIONS-SOME THOUGHTS

ON BASIC POLICY
Unlike the matters of operating policy considered in section 3, chariANN. § 14A:3-4(1) (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 202(a) (12) (McKinney 1986). We will
return to this point in subsection 4.3.
256 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
257 Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969).
258 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 122(9) (1983).
259 Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d at 405.
260

Id.
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table contributions involve activity that the shareholders could, and typically do, undertake on their own. This leads to a fundamental question
of policy. Why shouldn't the law let the shareholders themselves decide
the extent to which corporate resources should be devoted to charitable
causes and what those causes should be? Consider the irony inherent in
the following comments by the court in the A.P Smith case:
When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the hands of individuals they discharged their responsibilities as citizens by donating freely
for charitable purposes. With the transfer of most of the wealth to
corporate hands and the imposition of heavy burdens of individual taxation, 26
they
have been unable to keep pace with increased philanthropic
1
needs.

Why should the wealth of the corporations permit them to preempt the
charitable choices of the very shareholders to whom that wealth could
otherwise be distributed? The choice of beneficiaries is often a question
of personal taste, and there is no reason per se to favor the tastes of the
managers over those of the shareholders.2 6 2 Further, to the extent there
is an element of personal satisfaction in making a donation,26 3 it necessarily reaches the shareholder only in diluted form where the critical decision to make the gift is the corporate manager's. And it will be that
manager who basks in the charity's gratitude. In response to questions
such as these, Berkshire Hathaway chairman Warren E. Buffett adopted
a plan in 1981 that permits shareholders to designate the recipients of the
corporation's charity. Each of the corporation's 1,900 shareholders may
allocate $2 for each share owned to three charities of his or her choice,
and the corporation makes the gift in the name of the shareholder. 2
As an answer to these concerns, let us consider two views of corporate charitable giving, which may rationalize entrusting these choices to
management. The first recognizes that some charitable objectives may,
for any number of reasons, be closely tied to the corporation's business
261 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 NJ. 145, 153, 98 A.2d 581, 585-86, appeal dismissed,
346 U.S. 861 (1953). Whether the court's shift-of-wealth analysis is accurate as a matter of social
history is open to doubt. A 1971 study by the American Association of Fund Raising Counsel, Inc.
found that individual donors accounted for 87% of all philanthropic contributions in 1950 and 78%
in 1970. See M. FREMONT-SMrrH, PHILANTHROPY AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 45 (1972).
And in 1982, the President's Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives noted that almost 90% of
private giving was by individuals. Report of Contributions Strategies Committee, in THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVES, BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS 47, 49 (1982).

262 Cf. Blumenthal, Bricker's Dreamfor ShamrockFades as Company Studies Bid from Mesa,
Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1986, at 22, col. 1 (report that William H. Bricker, CEO of Diamond Shamrock
Corp., personally decides which civic events or charities corporation will support).
263 See Engel, supra note 16, at 22-23.
264 See Richards, supra note 59; Giving Shareholdersa Voice, in COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS,
CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 76 (1982). Bayless Manning had, more than twenty years earlier, proposed such a system of designations by shareholders. See Manning, supra note 140, at 1495 n.34.
See also Sproull, Cost-Effective Way to Spur Private Giving, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at
62.
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activities, so that management has a unique perspective, which should
preempt the individual preferences of shareholders. Thus, for example,
where the donation represents an implicit cost of doing business, it falls
within management's traditional expertise and discretion, and shareholders have no legitimate standing to interpose their personal charitable values. The second, in contrast, sees corporate donations as activity on
behalf of the shareholders, with the donations made by the corporation
merely because it enjoys some form of comparative advantage over the
individual shareholders in being the donor. The issue is then whether the
efficiencies that result from permitting management to make the donation outweigh the loss of individual shareholder choice and gratification,
and the inevitable risk that management's pattern of giving may depart
from the composite preferences of the shareholders.
In terms of the first rationale, charity may represent a subject for
management expertise for a variety of reasons. The commentary in the
A.L.I.'s Principles of Corporate Governance observes, for example, that
"a donation to public television may be made for reasons comparable to
those for sponsoring a commercial, and a contribution to local Red Cross
or Community Chest activities may be made for reasons of employee
well-being and morale."26 Consider, in this regard, the recent program
by Scott Paper Co. to introduce a new line of "Helping Hand" paper
goods by pledging to donate five cents to charity for each package
sold.26 6
Another instance for deferring to management's perspective as opposed to the shareholders' may be in the case of support for local charities, insofar as public and business opinion has come to recognize that a
corporation has an obligation to the communities in which it maintains
facilities.2 67 In subsection 3.3.3 we distinguished between the desires of
the typical proprietor and those of the typical passive shareholder, and
similar concerns may apply in the case of charitable donations.2 68 Consider the case of a manufacturing corporation with facilities in, say,
Muncie, Indiana, and shareholders dispersed throughout the nation.
While a reasonable proprietor (even an absentee proprietor) might feel a
265 A.L.I. PR1NCIPLEs-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment i, at 39. The Principlesadd that
one of the justifications for authorizing the corporation to make charitable gifts is while the underlying objective for the gift may be economic, the specific benefit to the corporation is often difficult to
prove, and it is therefore desirable to provide the corporation with a "reasonable zone of flexibility"
within which it may give away its resources without having to show specific resulting benefits. Id. at
41.
266 See Schwadel, Scott PaperOffers a "HelpingHand" to Charity Groups, Wall St. J., May 22,
1986, at 21, col. 2; Shiver, Scott Pledges5 CentsforEach Sale of New Products, L.A. Times, May 22,
1986, § IV, at 1, col. 3.
267 See, eg., Shop Talk, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1987, at 21, col. 3 (describing decision by Unisys
Corp. to maintain two corporate headquarters following Burroughs-Sperry merger and quoting CEO
W. Michael Blumenthal as stating: "Now we have to support two symphonies instead of one and
talk with two governors and two mayors.").
268 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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moral obligation to support the Muncie United Way or the local commu-

nity college, we cannot expect a portfolio manager in New York or an
individual investor in Los Angeles to share that commitment. This rationale would favor, therefore, corporate donations to local and other
charities that have a specialized relationship with the corporation over
ones to more general, national organizations, for with the latter there is
little reason to believe that the tastes and moral obligations of the hypothetical proprietor would systematically depart from those of the passive
shareholder.2 6 9
The second rationale, on the other hand, would permit donations to
organizations irrespective of their relationship to the corporation's business by reconceiving the corporation as, in part, the charitable agent for
its shareholders, to the extent it enjoys a comparative advantage. What
might be the sources of such comparative advantage? One strong candidate is the income tax law, which permits the corporation to deduct its
charitable donations.2 70 Inasmuch as dividends to the shareholders
would not have been deductible, permitting the corporation to make donations from pre-tax dollars effectively increases the federal tax subsidy
from one-to-one to three-to-one. 27 1 But is this necessarily a comparative
advantage from a societal point of view? While the enhanced subsidy
explains why any given group of shareholders might prefer having the

corporation make a donation on their behalf, it does not, as Professor
Brickley points out in his paper, 272 mean that a law permitting this practice results in a net gain to society as a whole. Rather, at issue is simply a
zero-sum game between the government and the charities, and there is no
269 Industry practice is to the contrary, however. A survey of corporate donations by 422 large
U.S. corporation, undertaken by The Conference Board for 1984, reveals that 42% of the donations
were made to national organizations, 26% to local organizations in the corporation's headquarters
community and 32% to local organizations in other communities. Further, the proportionate share
to national organizations has grown since the data were first compiled in 1978. See L. PLATZER,
ANNUAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS

16 (1986).

270 See generally, Engel, supra note 16, at 62; M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 135-36; MacAvoy, Cantor, Dana & Peck, ALI Proposalsfor Increased Controlof the Corporationby the Boardof
Directors" An Economic Analysis, in Statement of the Business Roundtable on the American Law
Institute's Proposed "Principlesof Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations" at C-1, C-23 (1983).
271 To see this point, assume that both the corporation and the shareholder are in the 50% tax
bracket and charitable donations are not deductible. The corporation earns $500,000, plus $250,000
in income tax and distributes the remaining $250,000 to its sole shareholder as a dividend. The
shareholder pays $125,000 in tax on the dividend, contributes $25,000 to her alma mater, Princeton,
and retains $100,000. But once charitable donations are deductible, the shareholder may contribute
$50,000 to Princeton, reduce her taxable income to $200,000, and thus retain the same $100,000
after tax. In effect, the government has matched her gift to Princeton by reducing her tax by
$25,000. And if the corporation were to make the deductible gift, it could contribute $100,000 to
Princeton, distribute $200,000 after taxes to the shareholder as a dividend, of which she would retain
$100,000 after tax. Thus, the total tax is decreased from $375,000 in the case where the donation is
not deductible to $300,000 in the case where it is deductible and made at the corporate level, and the
effective rate of matching gift is increased to three-for-one.
272 See Brickley, supra note 78, at 79-80.
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apparent policy reason for arguing that the net subsidy from the government to a particular charity should be tripled simply because the donation has come from a corporation as opposed to its shareholders.
A second possible comparative advantage for corporate giving is as
a solution to the collective action problem that is inherent in coordinating the activities of any diffused group of small-stakes holders.2 73 Consider, as an example, Mobil Corporation's support of public broadcasting
and, in particular, the television show "Masterpiece Theater."27 4 Suppose that Mobil has 400 million shares of stock outstanding, and that its
annual support for public broadcasting is $10 million, the equivalent of
2.5 cents per share. The various individuals with an economic stake in
Mobil's shares-whether individual shareholders or the beneficiaries of
institutional shareholders-might well derive far more than $10 million
of collective pleasure from public televisions, and therefore should be
willing to contribute at least that amount on a voluntary basis. But if the
hat were passed among Mobil shareholders, each individual receives no
assurance that his or her contribution would be matched by the others.
Thus, the shareholder's incentive to contribute is significantly eroded by
the
that funds sufficient to purchase the desired programuingrecognition
might not be raised even if he or she does contribute, but might be
raised even if he or she does not. By making the gift on its own, the

corporation may resolve this collective action problem by simultaneously
binding all of its shareholders to the common goal.275 At the same time,
having one large contribution by the corporation take the place of
thousands of small ones by its shareholders likely achieves a dramatic
273 For general discussions of the collective action problem, see M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION ch. 1 (1971); Schelling, On the Ecology of Micromotives, 25 PUB. INTEREST 61
(1971).
274 To simplify the analysis, this example ignores the possible public relations benefits that
Mobil derives from its support of public television as an alternative justification for permitting the
donations.
275 See, e.g., Vickrey, PrivatePhilanthropyandPublic Finance,in ALTRUISM, MORALrrY AND
ECONOMIC THEORY 149, 163 (E. Phelps ed. 1975). Admittedly, by solving the collective action
problem in this manner, the corporation creates a distributional problem in its stead. The owner of
10 shares is assessed 25 cents while the owner of 1000 shares is assessed $25, and there is no assurance that the latter would have been willing to contribute ten times as much--or for that matter,
anything at all-if the matter were left to voluntary self-assessment on the basis of the pleasure each
derived. One answer to this is the realization that both shareholders likely hold diversified portfolios
of equity claims--direct and (through pension funds, whole life insurance, savings invested in mutual funds and the like) indirect-so that an overassessment by corporation A on behalf of a charitable cause the shareholder does not strongly favor might well be offset by an underassessment by
corporation B on behalf of one he does. This is a variation of Professors McGowan and Wallich's
argument discussed in section 2, see Wallich & McGowan, supra note 25, but is narrower in that it
rests simply on the shareholder's status as a diversified holder on traditional financial claims.
Also, the example in the text involves a form of charity that supplies tangible benefits--entertainment-to the donor. The collective-action rationale is weaker where the donor's motives are
the pure joy of giving. See Calabresi, Comment, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY AND ECONOMIC THEORY
57, 58-60 (E. Phelps ed. 1975) (discussing the tension between the existence of altruistic pleasure in
giving and the concurrent need for coercive solutions to the implicit problems of collective action).
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reduction in the costs of fund-raising considerations and logically leads
to an overarching issue. Wouldn't the kinds of comparative advantages
enjoyed by the large corporation also be realized, and to a much greater
degree, by turning the matter over to the federal government, to serve as
the central disperser of, and assessor for, charitable largesse. The traditional resistance to this idea, and preference for corporate giving in its
stead, has stemmed both from concerns for big government and a preference for diversity and decentralization in philanthropic activity.27 6
While the prospect of concentrating the responsibility for charitable and
educational support in the government is indeed troublesome, the claims
of diversity and decentralization have a hollow ring when advanced to
justify keeping the decision in an elite corps of corporate executives, with
little true accountability to shareholders. This squarely invokes the various concerns for corporate managers serving as arbiters of the social welfare, which we surveyed in subsection 2.2.2.277 In addition, the
implications of corporate managements' potential influence over the policies of charitable and educational institutions have led commentator
Bayless Manning to caution that unfettered corporate giving "may more
conflict with than conform to our pluralistic preference."2 7" At the same
time, the recognized tendency of corporate giving programs to avoid
smaller and more controversial causes, 9 supports the speculation that
passing the matter to government would, if anything, enhance the diversity of the recipients.
Thus, in the final analysis, legitimating corporate giving-the basis
of the corporation's comparative advantages over its shareholders-may
open the door to philosophical problems that significantly undermine its
forcefulness as a rationale.
4.3

WHAT LIMITS PRESENTLY EXIST ON THE NATURE AND
AMOUNT OF CORPORATE DONATIONS?

With those policy perspectives in mind, let us examine the present
276 See, eg., A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 147-48, 98 A.2d 581, 583, appeal
dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953) (quoting president of Princeton University, who testified at trial); R.
EELLS, CORPORATION GiVING IN A FREE SOCIETY 88-104 (1956); A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2,
supra note 9 § 2.01 comment i, at 40; Prunty, supra note 237, at 471.
277 See also supranote 23. One response to some of these legitimacy concerns, as applied to the
present line of analysis, is that it is the shareholders' money that is being given away. Thus, if the
philanthropic tastes of the average shareholder are more closely shared by the typical corporate
executive than by the typical government administrator, a case may be made for keeping the decision
within corporate channels. This, however, ignores the fact that the taxpayers are subsidizing the
lion's share of the corporate gift.
278 Manning, supra note 140, at 1494-95.
279 See Richards, supra note 59; cf.F. ANDREWS, supra note 217, at 126 ("[C]orporate giving
still
traditional and custom-bound... more than half of the sampled companies gave from 90 to
is
100 per cent of their contributions to annually recurring drives."). But cf.M. FREMONT-SMrrH,
supra note 261, at 58-59 (discussing trend of increasing corporate support for arts and solutions to
urban problems).
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state of the law limiting managerial discretion over the objects and the
amount's of the corporation's philanthropy.
A threshold issue is whether the very state statutes that expressly
authorize corporate donations serve, at the time, as an indirect source of
limitation. That is, should the traditional statutory categories-"public
welfare" and "charitable, scientific, or educational purposes" to use the
Model Act formulation 2 8Q-be read as all-embracing.2 8 1 Professor
Blumberg has reviewed the state statutes in detail and questioned
whether these traditional categories are broad enough to assure complete
coverage of corporate responses to contemporary social problems.2 82
The A.L.I.'s Principlesof Corporate Governance has also deemed it desirable to paint with a broader brush than the state statutes and extend to
any "public83 welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic
2
purposes.

These concerns notwithstanding, it seems doubtful that the traditional statutory categories should be read narrowly to limit the objects of
the corporation's philanthropy. Indeed, courts have found the categories
flexible enough to shelter corporate expenditures which clearly did not
represent conventional philanthropy. In Kelly v. Bell,28 4 the Delaware
Court of Chancery applied that state's statute to uphold, as donations for
the public welfare, payments to local governments that United States
Steel Corporation had promised to make as part of a campaign to obtain
repeal of a state ad valorem tax on its machinery. 285 And in Schwartz v.
Romnes,2 86 the Second Circuit held that the expenditure of $50,000 by
New York Telephone Co. to promote passage of a state transportation
bond issue was not ultra vires. It reasoned that to the extent the payment
was prompted by the corporation's concern for the quality of transportation and its multiplier effects on the economy it was protected by the
New York statute's authorization of donations for the public welfare or
for civic or similar purposes.2 87
This flexibility is not surprising in light of the background of the
280 See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACr § 3.02(13) (1984).
281 This is closely linked to the issue, examined in subsection 3.3.1, of whether the statutory
authorization of donations should be read broadly to embrace any commitment of corporate resources. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
282 See Blumberg, supra note 13, at 193-201. He proposed the addition of references to expenditures for "civic" purposes or for "the betterment of social, economic, or environmental conditions" to plug any possible gaps. Id. at 201.
283 A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01(c).
284 Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd, 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970).
285 Id. at 74-75. The payments were equal to the tax U.S. Steel would have been required to
pay on the existing value of its machinery at the time of the commitment. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Delaware stated that it had doubts about describing the payments as gifts, but it agreed
with the lower court that the payments should be covered by the business judgment rule and affirmed on that basis. 266 A.2d at 879.
286 Schwartz v. Rommes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974).
287 Id. at 854.
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statutes. As we have seen,28 8 they were the product of a broad legislative
sentiment to remove any doubt about the legality of what had become, by
the time of their enactment, widespread corporate
practice. This, cou290
29
pled with the implications of the A.P. Smith, Pacific GrapeProducts,
and Union Pacific29 t decisions, reviewed in subsection 4.1, that consider-

able corporate discretion to engage in philanthropy exists even in the
absence of any statute, confirms the speculation that future courts are
unlikely to be stingy in construing
the scope of the various statutory cate2 92
gories of permissible donations.
Nonetheless, some limitation on management's discretion under the
statutes is essential. Thus, while the language of the statutes is unqualified, commentators have recognized that the corporation's power to be
charitable or philanthropic, like any of the corporation's other powers, is
to be exercised in furtherance of the corporate purposes and subject to
fiduciary obligations. 29 3 Consistent with this analysis are the opinions in
A.P. Smith2 94 and Theodora,29 5 where the existence of an unqualified
state statute did not dissuade the courts from implicitly recognizing the
additional requirement of reasonableness. And an express reasonableness limitation has been included in the A.L.I. Principles of Corporate
Governance.2 9 6
But what does reasonableness mean in the context where the corporation is giving away its money? Necessarily, this inquiry has two components: the purpose of the donation and its amount. As to the first,
commentators have emphasized that although the law no longer requires
288 See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
289 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861

(1953).
290 Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Pacific Grape Prods. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 634, 290 P.2d 481 (1955).
291 Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958).
292 Cf. Blumberg, supra note 13, at 200-01 (statutes should not be read to invalidate expenditures valid under liberal common-law benefit test).
293 See, e-g., Chirelstein, supranote 38, at 50; Garrett, CorporateDonations,22 Bus. LAW. 297,
301 (1967); Prunty, supra note 237, at 474-76; see also Latty, supra note 253, at 369. This argument
is more difficult to make under those state statutes that expressly provide that the corporation's
power to make donations exists "irrespective of corporate benefit." See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-221(b)(13) (1982); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 9(k) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:3-4(l) (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (McKinney 1986). Presumably, the
intent of these clauses is to reject. unequivocally, the old direct benefit rule, see supra notes 210-15
and accompanying text, and not to eliminate the requirement of corporate interest altogether. See
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 202(a)(12) note on legislative studies and reports, at 51 (McKinney 1986)
(all vestiges of the corporate benefit rule are eliminated, but contributions remain subject to the
business judgment rule); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-4(1) commissioners' comment-1968, at 159
(West 1969) (indicating that clause was "perhaps not necessary"). This interpretation is more readily apparent under the California statute, CAL. CORP CODE § 207(e) (West 1977), which provides
that the power to make donations exists "regardless of specific corporate benefit."
294 A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 160-61, 98 A.2d 581, 590, appeal dismissed,
346 U.S. 861 (1953).
295 Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969).
296 A.L.I. PRINCIPLE--TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01(c).
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a specific corporate benefit, some legitimate corporate objective or interest must be at stake.2 97 Ray Garrett, Sr., principal drafter of the Model
Act provision, has described the limitations embodied in the state statutes as follows:
Donations should be reasonable in amount in the light of the corporation's financial condition, bear some reasonable relation to the corporation's interest, and not be so "remote and fanciful" as to excite the
opposition of shareholders whose property is being used. Direct corporate benefit is no longer necessary, but corporate interest remains as
a motive.298
And, in a similar vein, the commentary to section 2.01(c) of the A.L.I.
Principlesof Corporate Governance notes that a factor in the calculus of
reasonableness is the nexus with the use of the corporate resources and
the corporation's business.29 9
The tension implicit in these attempts to articulate the nature of the
reasonableness requirement is between the desires to reject, at a philosophical level, the notion that management is free to substitute its own
charitable preferences for those of the shareholders and to preserve, at a
practical level, the board's discretion to make donations it reasonably
deems to be in the corporation's interest, free of the need to create a
record of offsetting corporate benefits."0° In the previous subsection, we
proposed addressing this dilemma by limiting the corporation to philanthropy that bore a distinct connection to its business, so that management would likely have a unique perspective or experience, different from
that of the shareholders as a whole.30 1 Presumably, the requirement of
the corporate interest or objective advanced by the commentators would
be broader and would permit contributions to general, national charities
such as the American Red Cross or American Cancer Society,30 2 on the
grounds that the corporation and its employees benefit from their activities, though that benefit is not distinct to the corporation. 3 Moreover,
297 In addition to the authorities cited supra note 293, see Blumberg, supra note 13, at 176
(criticizing liberalized benefit test, and advocating test that looks to whether donation reasonably
fulfills some business objective of the corporation); id. at 199 (discussing geographical limitations as
a means of assuring a reasonable relationship to corporate interest).
298 Garrett, supra note 293, at 301.
299 A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2, supranote 9, § 2.01 comment i, at 41; see also id. illustration
16. When this subsection was considered by the full Institute, New York lawyer Kenneth Bialkin,
Dean David Ruder, and others sought to go further and argued that, in order to accurately reflect
current law, the provision should include the limitation "when consistent with the interests of the
corporation." 61 A.L.I. PRoc. 472-73, 482-91 (1984). Bialkin's motion to that effect failed by a
substantial margin.
300 Cf 61 A.L.I. PRoc. 490 (remarks of Marshall Small regarding need to remove burdens
from directors); A.L.I. PRiNcIPLES-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment i, at 41 (importance of
reasonable zone of flexibility).
301 See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
302 See supra note 269.
303 In the minds of many commentators there is a clear distinction between corporate charity
for its own sake and corporate charity when there is some prospect of long-term benefit to the
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the A.L.I. Principles would go one step further (consistent with the
fourth phase of development discussed above in subsection 4.1), and
sanction charity for its own sake, albeit in very small doses.3 "4
Also, implicit in the reasonableness test is the requirement that the
gift not involve a pet charity of management. 30 5 To be sure, an exotic pet
charity may be foreclosed by the requirement of corporate interest or
nexus. But inasmuch as the pet charity restriction reflects the general
fiduciary concept that management must subordinate its self-interest to
the welfare of the corporation, it should logically be available to preclude
a donation that would otherwise pass muster. For example, the reasonableness test would likely permit a corporation to make a practice of contributing 1% of its annual earnings to the United Way campaign in the
city where it does business. But if the corporation's traditional contribution had been only 0.1%, the pet charity limitation might preclude the
corporation's CEO from increasing its 30
contribution
ten-fold in the year
6
he becomes chairman of the campaign.
Reflection upon the corporate interest requirement and the charity
limitations calls into question the result in the Theodora case.30 7 There,
the court upheld a personal holding company's gift of its stock, equal in
value to 2.8% of its annual earnings, to a foundation under the control of
the corporation's majority shareholder, to be used to fund a western
camp for underprivileged boys, on whose grounds the shareholder had a
home. The court dismissed the limiting language of the A.P. Smith
case 30 8 and stated that the Delaware statute authorized any reasonable
corporate gift of a charitable or educational nature. 30 9 This led Professor
Blumberg to conclude simply that the case was "unsound, ' 3 10 and one
corporation, even though the likelihood of full payback seems remote. See, eg., Ruder, supra note
66, at 218-19, 221-23; Schwartz, supra note 11, at 530-32. On its face, this reveals a willingness to
extend the traditional deference of the business judgment rule from conventional business decision
making to an area where management's true motives are likely to be multi-textured and, as we have
seen, the shareholders are capable of acting for themselves. But perhaps the true explanation for the
distinction is the struggle to find some-any-framework for harmonizing management's fiduciary
obligations with the reality of corporate charitable practices.
304 A.L.I. PRINCIPLES-TD#2, supra note 9 § 2.01 comment i, illustration 17, at 43 (permitting anonymous gift of $2,000 to New York hospital by corporation with annual earnings of $13-$15
million and sales and operations only in western U.S.; contributions of relatively small amounts are
normally reasonable even though a clear nexus to the corporation's business is lacking).
305 See, e-g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 161, 98 A.2d 581, 590, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
306 An example is a recent suit by the minority shareholders of closely-held Beverly Hills Hotel
Corp. against the controlling shareholders, Ivan F. Boesky (of recent insider trading notoriety) and
his wife. The suit alleges that, for reasons of "personal self-aggrandizement," Boesky caused the
corporation to donate $750,000 to the United Jewish Appeal, of which $195,000 went to the appeal
in Los Angeles, where the hotel was located, and $555,000 to the appeal in New York, where Boesky
headed the fund-raising drive. Wall St. J.,Apr. 23, 1986, at 10, col. 2.
307 Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969).
308 See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
309 Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d at 405.
310 Blumberg, supra note 13, at 199 n.264.
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cannot imagine the court reaching the same result were the corporation
publicly held. Realistically, the case no doubt turns on the fact that it
involved a personal holding company, with the court showing the same
tolerance of the controlling shareholder's self-indulgence as we saw in the
Wrigley case. 3 11 Thus, consistent with the comparative advantage rationale discussed in the previous subsection,31 2 the court was willing to permit the controlling shareholder to take advantage of the significant tax
incentives to making the gift at the corporate level-its after-tax cost was
only fifteen cents on the dollar3 13-even though his charitable goals may
not have been completely shared by the minority shareholders.31 4
The final issue embodied in the reasonableness calculus is the
amount of the corporation's donation. The Theodora case suggests that
the Internal Revenue Code's limits on corporate charitable deductionsthen five percent, and now ten percent, of income-provide a helpful
guide, 315 but this, too, must be viewed in light of the special features of
the case. The commentary to the A.L.I. Principlesof Corporate Governance states that the issue should turn on what is customary among comparable corporations in relation to their earnings and assets and the
nexus between the contribution and the corporation's business, with
greater amounts requiring a stronger nexus. 316 Thus, industry custom
will typically supply the key factor. For larger corporations, information
on industry custom is available through the detailed annual surveys on
corporate giving prepared by The Conference Board, a business information service which break out and analyze the information by. industry,
corporate size, geographic location, nature of the beneficiary and other
factors. 317 And the ready availability of this information should assure
that industry custom will typically be a critical consideration in a large
corporation's charitable giving program, as corporations with donations
311 See supra subsection 3.1.2.
312 See supra notes 270-79 and accompanying text.
313 Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d at 405.
314 In fact, previous donations to the foundation had been unanimously ratified by the shareholders. The real source of controversy was likely the corporation's refusal to also make donations
to the charitable corporations of the principal minority holder (who was the former wife of the

majority holder) and her daughter. See id. at 402.
315 Id. at 405.
316 A.L.I. PRINCILES-TD#2, supra note 9, § 2.01 comment i, at 41.
317 In 1984, the most recent year for which information is available, 2000 large U.S. corporations were surveyed and 422 responded. See L. PLATZER, supranote 269, at vi. The data reveal that
the median amount of 1984 contributions as a percentage of worldwide income was 0.85%, with a

lower quartile of 0.53% and an upper quartile of 1.54%. Thus, half the respondents donated between 0.53% and 1.54% of their pre-tax income to charitable causes. Id.at 26. Based on Department of Commerce and Internal Revenue Service data, total 1984 contributions by all corporations,
as a percentage of their estimated pre-tax income, was 1.61%. Id. at 25. Thus, the mean for all
corporations was higher than the upper quartile for the large corporations in The Conference Board
survey, a fact which suggests that the shareholders of small corporations may liberally use corporate
assets to fund their personal charitable objectives--as in the Theodora case-at a reduced after-tax
cost.
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significantly below the norm for peer corporations will be likely targets
for pressure from local and national charities to expand their giving and
those with donations significantly above the norm will be vulnerable to
shareholder criticism and, perhaps,
lawsuits on the grounds that they
31 8
were excessively generous.
Of course, industry custom may change over time. The Reagan Administration has called upon the private sector to assume greater responsibility for matters of social welfare. As part of this general goal, The
President's Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives recommended in
1982 that corporations double the level of their cash contributions to
nonprofit organizations, with the goal of giving at least 2% of pre-tax
income. 3 19 Based upon the discussion above, we can see these efforts as
having a two-fold effect. They not only put pressure on corporate executives to expand their giving, but also may serve to change the overall
climate of business and public opinion and thereby reduce the risk that
such giving will be challenged. As we have seen, however, the trend, if
any, is in the opposite charitable contributions for 1986 will show the
first year-to-year decline in sixteen years.32 °

318 An important factor in determining what is customary may be the location of the corporation's headquarters. Some communities, such as Baltimore and Minneapolis, have strong traditions
of corporate giving, with clubs comprised of local companies that have pledged to donate 2% or 5%
of their annual earnings to charity. See S. LYDENBERG, A. MARLIN, S. STRUB & COUNCIL ON
ECONOMIC PRIORrrIEs, RATING AMERICA'S CORPORATE CONSCIENCE 20-21 (1986); Troy, Statistical Analysis of Corporate Philanthropy, in COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 136, 138 (1982).
319 Report of the ContributionsStrategies Committee, supra note 261, at 48.
320 Teltsch, supra note 87.

